Depart of Energy Non-Proliferation Programs

By: Molly Pickett

March 15, 2004

Department of Energy Nonproliferation and Verification R&D

Program Description
This program focuses on two key areas:

  • Proliferation Detection: Developing and demonstrating technologies to prevent nuclear materials diversion, identify and characterize nuclear weapon activities in states of concern, counter nuclear smuggling, and verify nuclear arms reduction.
  • Nuclear Explosion Monitoring: Develop and field ground-based and satellite-based sensors capable of detecting, locating, identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions occurring in the atmosphere, in space, underground, or underwater.
  • A third program, Chemical and Biological National Security, was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security in FY 2003. This program develops, demonstrates, and delivers technologies and systems that will improve the U.S. capability to prepare for and respond to chemical or biological attacks.

Program Accomplishments

  • Completed an advanced prototype LIDAR sensor and conducted flight tests.
  • Transferred a prototype wide band radio frequency technology to a user for testing.
  • Used experimental data from the Multispectral Thermal Imager (MTI) satellite to assess the utility of nonproliferation remote sensing technologies.
  • Launched a GPS satellite with two new-generation nuclear detonation detection sensors in January 2001.
  • Developed and deployed a system utilizing environmental sampling and DNA analysis to provide early detection of a biological attack at the Winter Olympic Games.
  • Demonstrated a chemical detection system in the Washington, DC Metro.

Nonproliferation and International Security

Program Description
There are four major functional areas of the Nonproliferation and International Security Program:

  • Nonproliferation Policy: Includes fuel cycle technology development programs such as the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program; supports global nonproliferation regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention; supports regional nonproliferation initiatives, especially in South and East Asia; promotes warhead dismantlement and fissile material transparency. FY 2005 efforts include purchase and security of HEU from research reactors in Russia.
  • International Safeguards: Supports implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; fosters international cooperation on additional safeguards measures; and improves the security and accountability of weapons-usable nuclear material in several former Soviet republics
  • Export Control: Regulates U.S. nuclear-related exports; supports multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee; and works with Russia and the Newly Independent States to develop strong, effective export controls
  • Treaties and Agreements: Supports implementation of nonproliferation and international security initiatives, agreements, and treaties; and responds to unanticipated nonproliferation requirements that are important to U.S. national security

Program Accomplishments

  • Completed canning of 3,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies at the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan. The material contained several tons of weapons grade plutonium.
  • Secured all of North Korea's spent nuclear fuel under IAEA safeguards (prior to 2003), as required by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
  • Reached preliminary agreement with Russia on the cost of spent fuel management and the pilot shipment site for the Russian Fuel Return Program.
  • Trained and conducted dialogues on nonproliferation and cooperative monitoring with officials and experts from the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and East Asia.
  • Demonstrated two technologies- a digital camera for real-time analysis of suspect shipments and an analyzer capable of identifying specific dual use materials- to U.S. Customs that could improve control over nuclear exports.

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

Program Description
The Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program upgrades physical security at Russian nuclear facilities. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has identified 105 nuclear sites in the former Soviet Union that require security upgrades. The sites contain roughly 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material. They include:

  • 53 Navy nuclear sites
  • 11 Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) weapons complex facilities
  • 10 Strategic Rocket Forces sites
  • 31 civilian nuclear sites.

The Department of Energy hopes to complete all security upgrades by 2008. The FY 2005 budget emphasizes protecting Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces sites. The MPC&A program also assists in building Russia's capability to operate and maintain security upgrades, ultimately without U.S. support.

  • The Material Consolidation and Conversion program aims to consolidate weapons-usable material into fewer buildings at fewer sites.
  • The Radiological Dispersion Devices (Radiological Threat Reduction) program works to secure radiological sources at Russian nuclear waste sites.
  • The Second Line of Defense program helps detect illicit traffic in nuclear and radioactive materials through installation of radiation detection equipment at border crossings. In addition, the program helps blend down highly enriched uranium at civilian nuclear sites, strengthens trucks and rail cars used to transport nuclear materials, conducts training courses on nonproliferation and materials control, and conducts inspections of nuclear sites.
A new project in this program area is the Megaports initiative, which works with other governments to train law enforcement officials and supply key international ports with equipment to detect nuclear or radioactive materials before they reach the United States.

Program Accomplishments

  • Russian Navy Nuclear Complex: Completed rapid upgrades at 39 Navy sites that store or handle about 60 metric tons (MT) of weapons usable nuclear material and several hundred at-risk warheads. Comprehensive upgrades are complete at 8 sites and underway or planned for 10 additional sites. Comprehensive upgrades on 100% of the 11 Navy fuel and other nuclear material storage sites were budgeted for completion in FY 2004
  • Strategic Rocket Forces: Initiated MPC&A upgrades at 16% of the projected 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites (currently 14 sites have been approved for upgrades by the U.S Government).
  • MINATOM Weapons Complex: The MINATOM Weapons Complex consists of seven sites and three Enterprises of the Nuclear Weapons Complex (ENWC) containing approximately 500 metric tons (MT) of weapons usable nuclear material. Rapid security upgrades at these sites are 22% complete and comprehensive updates are 4% complete.
  • Civilian Nuclear Sites: Of the 31 (18 in Russia, 13 in Newly Independent States) sites holding 40 MT of weapons usable nuclear material, 98% have received rapid upgrades with the other 2% expected to be completed by the end of FY 04. 54% have received comprehensive upgrades (98% were expected to be completed by the end of FY 03).
    • Rapid Upgrades include establishing controlled areas and limits on personnel access to nuclear material, implementing the “two-person rule”, conducting baseline inventories, bricking up windows, hardening doors, installing locks and steel cages, and implementing random guard controls.
    • Comprehensive security upgrades include hardening facilities to allow relocation of guards closer to the target, installing interior and exterior detection systems, closedcircuit television systems, monitoring and assessment systems, electronic access control
      systems, central alarm monitoring stations, enhancing radio communications, and conducting advanced computerized inventories of nuclear materials.
    • The MCC Program has reduced the total number of buildings containing nuclear weaponsusable material from 162 to 139 in the former Soviet Union. More than 3.25 metric tons of Russian HEU has been converted to LEU. 141 Trucks and 59 rail cars have been hardened for transporting nuclear materials. Radiation detection equipment has been installed at 12 border crossings.

Russian Transition Initiative

Program Description
Beginning in FY 2002, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program were combined into a new program, the Russian Transition Initiative. The RTI program seeks to prevent the "brain drain" of Russian weapons expertise to proliferating states or terrorist groups by engaging Russian weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians in long-term, peaceful activities. In addition, NCI projects focus on diversifying the economies of Russia's ten "closed" nuclear cities in order to create opportunities for commercial business development, as well as civilian sector jobs. Currently, issues of liability protections for American workers and contractors in Russia are stalling these initiatives but are expected to be resolved within the next year.

Program Accomplishments

  • Since 1994, the NCI and IPP programs have engaged over 14,000 former Soviet weapon scientists, engineers, and technicians at over 200 institutes and initiated over 400 projects.
  • In January 2003, the IPP program and Luxoft, a Russian software company, opened a facility to teach software programming to former Soviet nuclear weapons researchers. The facility, located at Moscow's Kurchatov Institute, will eventually train 500 scientists and engineers to enter the global information technology industry
  • In December, 2001, the U.S. initialed an NCI Access Arrangement with Russia to allow acceleration and expansion of NCI projects in the closed cities.
  • The NCI program has achieved a 15% reduction in the physical footprint of the Avangard nuclear weapons plant in the closed Russian city of Sarov. Russia signed a closure agreement to cease nuclear weapons work at Sarov by 2003.
  • Open Computing Centers have been established in Sarov and Snezhinsk, through which scientists can perform contract research in software development and computer modeling. Nonproliferation Centers were also created in the two cities to engage scientists in
    nonproliferation analysis and research and to promote a culture of nonproliferation in Russia.
  • Non-profit International Development Centers were opened in Zheleznogorsk and Snezhinsk to help diversify the economies of the closed cities.
  • In January 2002, the U.S. and Kazakhstan launched a joint effort, under the auspices of the IPP program, to create new commercial opportunities at the ULBA Metallurgical plant in Kazakhstan, a former nuclear weapons facility. The project will develop the capability to separate low-enriched uranium (LEU) from uranium concentrates for sale to commercial reactors around the world. Another joint effort at the ULBA plant, launched in July 2002, will help convert the facility to produce copper beryllium for commercial applications. Together, the two joint projects are expected to create at least 200 new jobs for former Soviet weapons experts.

HEU Transparency Implementation

Program Description
In February 1993, the U.S. agreed to buy 500 tons of high-enriched uranium- the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear weapons- derived from Russian nuclear weapons. The agreement covers a period of 20 years. The HEU transparency program is intended to provide confidence that the low-enriched uranium sold to the United States is indeed weapons-origin. Transparency is ensured through on-site monitoring teams, portable non-destructive assay instruments, and permanently installed monitoring equipment. Russian representatives are also allowed to monitor activities at U.S. facilities where downblended Russian HEU is processed.

Program Accomplishments

  • Monitored the conversion of 201 metric tons of HEU since 1995, enough material to make 8,040 nuclear bombs. The United States Enrichment Corporation, acting as the executive agent of the HEU agreement, has paid Russia approximately $3 billion for the LEU derived from the HEU.
  • During 2003, the program conducted 23 monitoring trips to the four Russian uraniumprocessing facilities, and the Transparency Monitoring Office was staffed for 150 days – resulting in approximately 256 monitoring days at the facilities.
  • On June 19, 2002, the United States and Russia signed a new implementing agreement establishing flexible, market-based pricing terms for the remaining 11 years of the HEU purchase agreement.

International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation

Program Description
In cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations, this program focused on
developing, implementing, and sustaining improved safety at nuclear facilities in order to prevent
accidents and mitigate their consequences.

Program Accomplishments

  • Facilitated the closure of the Chernobyl plan in Ukraine and the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan
  • Under the Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program, projects were completed in nine countries at 26 nuclear sites with 67 reactors. This program closed out in FY 2003 and remaining funds were transferred to the Nonproliferation and International Security program.

Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production- Russia

Program Description
In fiscal 2003, the Energy Department took over the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program from the Defense Department. The program facilitates the shutdown of Russia’s three remaining weapons-grade plutonium reactors. In return, the U.S. will modernize an existing fossil fuel plant in Seversk and construct a new fossil fuel plant in Zheleznogorsk in order to meet Russia’s energy needs. The program also focuses on improving reactor safety pending shutdown.

Program Accomplishments

  • On March 12, 2003, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev signed Implementing Agreements for the shutdown of Russia's plutonium production reactors and replacement with fossil fuel plants. The reactors have approximately 15 years remaining in their operational lifetimes, and could produce 25 metric tons of plutonium during that time span.
  • On May 27, 2003, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced that the National Nuclear

Security Administration had awarded contracts to Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services for shutting down the Russian reactors. The contracts are worth approximately $466 million.

Accelerated Materials Disposition

Program Description
The Department of Energy proposed this program in FY 2004 to explore options for accelerating the disposition of Russian fissile materials, including purchasing additional Russian HEU for use in U.S. research reactors, purchasing additional Russian HEU to downblend into LEU for storage in a LEU reserve in the United States, and accelerating conversion of U.S. and Russian research reactors so that they can use LEU fuel. The initiative did not receive Congressional support for FY 2004 and is not requested in FY 2005.

Fissile Material Disposition- U.S. Program Description
This program is responsible for eliminating U.S. stockpiles of surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium and ensuring that these materials are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability. Approximately 38 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 174 metric tons of HEU have been declared surplus.

The current U.S. approach to plutonium disposition relies almost exclusively on the irradiation of Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel to dispose of surplus plutonium. Funding for an alternative approach, immobilization in ceramic glass, was zeroed out in fiscal 2002.

In accordance with the September 2000 U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, two facilities will be built in the United States at the Savannah River Site (SRS): a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility and a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. Construction was originally scheduled to begin in FY 2004 but has now been postponed until May 2005. This is primarily due to Congressional requirements that construction of the U.S. and Russian facilities be done in parallel and concerns about liability protections for U.S. workers in Russia. The U.S. approach to HEU disposition involves blending the material down to low-enriched uranium for use in power or research reactors.

Plutonium Disposition- Russia

Program Description
Under an agreement signed on June 4, 2000 by former President Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the United States and Russia each pledged to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium either by immobilizing it or converting it into mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel. Through the Plutonium Disposition in Russia program, the United States is assisting Russia in constructing a facility to disassemble nuclear warheads and a MOX fuel fabrication facility. The United States will simultaneously build similar facilities in the United States (see above: Fissile Material Disposition – U.S.) The two countries pledged to initially dispose of 2 metric tons of plutonium per year, with the eventual goal of doubling that rate.

Currently, issues of liability protections for American workers and contractors in Russia have delayed construction of the MOX fuel facility until May 2005.

Program Accomplishments

  • Secured $300 million in pledged funds from the United Kingdom, Japan, and France to support plutonium disposition activities.
  • Completed an equilibrium core design for Russian VVER-1000 reactors to enable them to burn MOX fuel.
  • Helped developed gas turbine, modular helium reactors to expand plutonium disposition activities in Russia.

Offsite Source Recovery Project

Program Description
Under this program, the United States recovers excess and unwanted domestic sealed sources from non-DoE sites, and places them in storage at DoE facilities to reduce the risk of their possible use in a radiological dispersal device.

Additional information on DOE programs.