Securing Nuclear Materials: a comparison of key initiatives
August 24, 2004
For more information contact: Robert Gard, rgard@armscontrolcenter.org
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BUSH ADMINISTRATION Global Threat Reduction Initiative, May 2004 |
U.S. CONGRESS Senate Amendment to FY 05 Defense Authorization Bill (Sen. Domenici) |
JOHN KERRY'S PROPOSALS AS OF 1 JUNE 2004 |
HARVARD'S BELFER CENTER March 2003 and May 2004 Reports |
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT for INT'L. PEACE Draft Report, June 2004 |
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Impact on Russia |
Repatriate all Russian-origin fresh HEU by the end of 2005. Accelerate and complete repatriation of Russian- origin spent fuel by 2010. | Accelerate efforts to secure, remove or eliminate fissile materials from reactors and other vulnerable sites around the world. | Move vulnerable materials from unsecured sites in Russia to more secure sites in Russia within 4 years. | Remove weapons-usable nuclear material from civilian research reactors and other vulnerable sites within 4 years. | Rapidly repatriate fuel from former Soviet Republics. |
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Impact Worldwide |
Accelerate and complete repatriation of all U.S.-origin spent fuel within 10 years. | Arrange for secure packaging and shipment of fissile materials to countries willing to accept and secure it or to the United States. | Remove bomb making material from vulnerable sites around the world within 4 years. | Arrange for safe and secure transport of materials to secure sites in the United States and other willing countries. | Remove and secure weapons-usable materials from vulnerable sites within 4 years. |
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Converting Fuel |
Convert civilian research reactor s that use HEU to use low enriched uranium (in U.S. by 2013) and throughout the world. | Convert research and other reactors fueled by HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and alternative fuels. | Help Russia accelerate the process of blending down HEU and disposing of plutonium. | Shut down unnecessary reactors and convert those for which there is a continuing need to LEU fuel. | Pursue a more aggressive policy to end the use of HEU in research reactors and accelerate efforts with Russia to develop LEU fuels. |
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Security Upgrades |
Provide for interim security upgrades at vulnerable sites and long-term upgrades at sites where materials will remain for extended periods of time. | Provide interim security upgrades for the period until fissile material can be removed. | Provide rapid security upgrades at Russian sites within 1 year. | ||
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Closures and Incentives |
Provide assistance in the closure and decommissioning of sites identified as high risk. | Offer a range of incentives for facilities to give up fissile material at their site. | |||
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Multilateral Engagement |
International cooperation will be needed. | Support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other countries to facilitate the removal of fissile materials and complete security upgrades at vulnerable sites. | Support the IAEA to strengthen their rigorous inspection protocols. | G-8 leaders should agree to launch a "Strategic Materials Accelerated Removal and Transport" initiative to complete removal efforts within 5 years. | Work with other countries, such as NATO members, to develop an international response force in the event of theft from vulnerable sites. |
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U.S. Government Implementation
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Establish a single organization within DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration to focus on these efforts. | Establish a task force at DOE with wide authority to secure, remove and dispose of fissile material around the world. | Establish a National Coordinator for Nuclear Terrorism and Counterproliferation | Establish an office at DOE that consolidates resources, authority and expertise for all efforts. | |
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Funding |
Dedicate $450 million for these efforts over 10 years. More funding will be necessary but the sources of such funding have not been identified. | Additional $40 million per year over current funding of about $9 million (to be requested in the Energy and Water Appropriations bill). | Funding of $50 million per year. | Funding of $50 million per year. |
Sources:
Remarks by Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham to the IAEA, May 26, 2004
http://www.doe.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC_ID=15949&BT_CODE=PR_SPEECHES&TT_CODE=PRESSSPEECH
S. Amdt. 3192 to S. 2400 (FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act)
Bunn, Matt, Anthony Wier and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, March 2003
Bunn, Matt, Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, May 2004
Speech by John Kerry on 1 June 2004
http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2004_0601.html
Cirincione, Joseph, et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2004.