Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

September 23, 2004

For more information contact: Robert Gard, rgard@armscontrolcenter.org

Cooperative and coordinated efforts by participating countries will give strength and substance to the broad political consensus against proliferation and help address an increasingly important challenge to international security. --- Statement on the Proliferation Security Initiative, www.whitehouse.gov.

Announced by President Bush in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an informal commitment by member countries to coordinate actions to halt shipments of dangerous materials and technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.  Using their own laws and resources, these countries agree to stop proliferation at sea, in the air, and on land. 

Originally consisting of only eleven members, more than 60 other nations have now expressed support for the initiative.

Member countries:

Original 11:  Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

New members participating in PSI meetings:  Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, Singapore, and Turkey

Members of ship boarding agreements: Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama.

Member PSI participation since its inception:

Five international meetings

Ten joint exercises involving the boarding of planes and ships

In an effort to turn the President’s initiative into an operational agreement the Statement on Interdiction Principles was released on September 4, 2003. It calls on participants and other states affected by these issues to:

  • Take steps or emplace measures that prevent the transfer of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials, between states and non-state actors that are a proliferation danger.
    1. Establish points of contact
    2. Identify operational assets
    3. Engage in training efforts
    4. Promote industry outreach
  • Coordinate information exchange while protecting security concerns, cooperate in interdiction operations, and provide appropriate resources to these efforts.
  • Strengthen national legal authority and international laws and frameworks to facilitate coordination and cooperation.
  • Take appropriate action (including searches) against such vessels in their territorial waters, or give their consent to others to search vessels flying their flag in another’s territorial waters, that are suspected of carrying such cargoes.
  • Inspect aircraft or other modes of transport at their airports or other facilities suspected of carrying such cargoes.

State Department officials have emphasized that this is not another organization; it is an “activity”that involves interdiction exercises (including sea, air, and land exercises) designed to improve the interdiction skills of the participating countries, and real, coordinated seizures.  As such, there is no formal mechanism for regular coordination with the UN, nor are there formal provisions within PSI to provide training and assistance in countries seeking to increase their capacity to support PSI efforts.

PSI activities are designed to complement and reinforce other nonproliferation mechanisms, not replace them. All PSI activities will be consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.

Recent Success

The PSI has seen real results with the diversion of a German-owned ship, which was carrying a shipment of uranium centrifuge equipment to Libya in October of 2003. Not only did this operation represent a successful interdiction, but it was also a major contributing factor in the decision of the Libyan government to give up the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

PSI is an example of a new initiative in the area of nonproliferation that is a step in the right direction.

Advantages of the PSI

  • Monitors and targets states that are believed to traffic WMD materials.
  • Creates a global partnership for interdiction.
  • Permits membership of any state.
  • Fosters law enforcement cooperation among nations.
  • Increases information and intelligence sharing.
  • Encourages the adoption of legal mechanisms to control WMD trafficking.
  • Reinforces existing national legal authorities and international law concerning WMD.
  • Promotes the development of new treaties such as the “hot pursuit, ship rider and communications agreements.”

Disadvantages of the PSI

  • Requires more permanent members to demonstrate a real global commitment.
  • Necessitates greater efforts to protect security concerns of information sharing.
    • Incomplete information sharing debilitates PSI functions and generates a sense of mistrust.
  • Lacks coordinating mechanisms and personnel to implement or enforce action against WMD traffickers.
  • Lacks an independent budget to fund PSI activities.
    • PSI member states include numerous small countries that have minimal resources to allocate towards the initiative.
  • Fails to create a consistent outline of specific circumstances warranting action.
    • Legitimacy of PSI activities can only come within the framework of national legal authorities and international law.
For more information contact: Robert Gard, rgard@armscontrolcenter.org