Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Positions and Recommendations for 2005 on Cooperative Threat Reduction, Fissile Material Clean-out, and New Nuclear Weapons

December 15, 2004

For more information contact: Robert Gard, rgard@armscontrolcenter.org

Threat Reduction Assistance and Non-Proliferation

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation strongly supports the mission and goals of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and related programs across the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State. These programs, designed to enhance U.S. and global security by addressing the threat of unsecured nuclear weapons and materials, have made significant progress toward ensuring that weapons and materials of mass destruction, and the know-how to fashion WMD, do not fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. However, there is an urgent need for increased resources and greater efficiency across these programs in order to speed up their progress.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), originally passed by Congress in 1991, helps the former Soviet Union secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Over the past decade, the original program has expanded significantly beyond the original threat posed by manufactured weapons and is also responsible for securing the sensitive materials necessary to fabricate new weapons and for isolating the know-how to do so. The result is a confusing labyrinth of projects and jurisdictions; but the program is one of the most important tools in protecting Americans from the threat of WMD.

The Department of Defense houses the CTR program, which generally provides funds for transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The Department of State coordinates export and border control programs and efforts to provide former Soviet scientists and engineers with research grants so that they will not sell their know-how to terrorists or rogue states. The Department of Energy (DOE) generally manages programs to secure nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons facilities. The DOE also assists in employing former Soviet weapons scientists, disposing of Russian plutonium, and closing plutonium-producing reactors. Other non-proliferation programs at DOE develop detection technology for preventing the proliferation of WMD worldwide.

U.S. Programs in Russia

U.S. nonproliferation programs that secure and dispose of Russian nuclear materials, dismantle former Soviet WMD and delivery systems, and engage former weapons experts in peaceful pursuits are critical to preventing terrorist acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Over the past 12 years, these programs have resulted in deactivation or destruction of 6,312 nuclear warheads, 537 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 128 bombers, 708 nuclear air to surface missiles, and over 1,000 other weapons systems. In addition, 260 tons of fissile materials have received security upgrades and more than 58,000 former weapons scientists have been engaged in peaceful work. (For a complete list of accomplishments, see the Nunn-Lugar scorecard at http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar.html.) Although these programs have scored important, measurable successes, much work remains to be done. At the current level of funding, it will take 13 more years to safeguard Russia’s facilities and material.

In 2001, the Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board released a report card on DOE’s nonproliferation programs with Russia. This bipartisan task force, chaired by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler, recommended that the United States spend $30 billion over 10 years on programs with Russia. However, the current funding level of $1.7 billion per year, which includes non-proliferation programs with countries outside the former Soviet Union, falls far short of that goal.

Lack of Russian cooperation must also be overcome to implement these programs effectively. Moscow has shown reluctance to allow U.S. access to Russian weapons facilities and remains locked in a legal dispute with the United States over protections for American agencies and contractors in Russia. The Bush Administration is examining revisions of existing laws to protect U.S. contractors - who are in the country to construct factories for downblending Russian plutonium and to convert weapons production sites into peaceful facilities - from liability should any accidents occur involving radioactive material. Russia has rejected the liability terms and the construction of a new facility for converting plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for civilian power plants has been delayed at least a year.

Programs with Other Nations

In Fiscal Year 2004, for the first time, Congress approved expansion of Nunn-Lugar programs to other nations outside the former Soviet Union by authorizing the President to spend $50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar funds elsewhere in the world. FY 2005 authorization legislation removed the $50 million ceiling on this spending. While Iraq and Libya are logical places to start, there are numerous other countries where fissile material may have been produced. It is critical to start dealing with these other countries so that terrorist groups or rogue states do not gain access to dangerous materials or scientists skilled in WMD research and development.

In addition to the authorization for CTR expansion, the FY 2005 DOE budget includes an increase of over $3 million for nonproliferation export control programs targeted at countries outside the former Soviet Union. A growing portion of DOE’s International Materials Protection and Cooperation program is also dedicated to the Megaports initiative that installs radiation detection equipment at major international shipping ports. Even with this progress, much more needs to be done.

Recommendations the Center supports:

Support new Lugar legislation to improve authorities to address urgent nonproliferation crises and United States nonproliferation operations.
Amend Nunn-Lugar legislation so that CTR funds can be used in countries such as Libya, where remaining sanctions prohibit its implementation, or institute waivers for the same purpose on a case by case basis.
Increase budget allocations for Department of Defense CTR initiatives and authorize expanded cooperation with other states that need funding and expertise to secure WMD materials.
Organize a series of high-level diplomatic meetings between U.S. and Russian officials to increase CTR implementation efficiency and to resolve disputes over liability.
Raise the level of funding for U.S. nonproliferation programs consistent with the 2001 recommendations of the Baker-Cutler Task force, which called for $30 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation efforts (still less than 1% of the military budget).
Establish a high-level office to coordinate and oversee nonproliferation programs across the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State. A nonproliferation office similar to the office of the Global AIDS Coordinator would provide this issue with the attention that it deserves; allow for a centralized approach and coordination across agencies, and foster the appointment of special envoys to oversee U.S. efforts on multiple proliferation fronts.
Call for an international summit of G8 Global Partnership countries to meet funding commitments made at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit and clear obstacles to effective implementation. At its launch at Kananaskis, Partnership nations committed to raise $20 billion over 10 years to combat the spread of WMD. The United States pledged $10 billion of these funds.

Fissile Material Clean-out

Hundreds of tons of weapons grade nuclear materials are stored at power and research reactors around the world with inadequate security. Research reactors operating with highly enriched uranium (HEU) at university sites are a part of this problem.

The Center supports the efforts of the Bush Administration to implement the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), designed to accelerate measures for preventing high-risk nuclear and radiological materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. The program includes: accelerating the repatriation of Russian-origin, high-enriched uranium fuel and both Russian and U.S.- origin spent fuel; converting the cores of civilian research reactors that use high-enriched uranium to use low-enriched uranium instead; and identifying and securing equipment not covered by existing threat reduction efforts.

Congress approved $30 million for GTRI and other programs to secure vulnerable materials in FY2005. The Administration has recommended $450 million be spent on GTRI over 10 years. The Center believes that this funding must be increased to allow for the program to accomplish its goals in a much shorter time frame.

Recommendations the Center supports:

Approve at least $50 million in funding per year to conduct fissile material clean-out activities.
Remove weapons-usable nuclear material from civilian research reactors and other vulnerable sites within 4 years.
Establish an office at the Department of Energy to consolidate resources, authority and expertise for all global cleanout efforts.

New Nuclear Weapons

The Center strongly opposes efforts by the Bush Administration to introduce a new generation of nuclear weapons through research on a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, better known as a “nuclear bunker buster,” and new low-yield nuclear weapons. By requesting funds for research on these weapons, the Administration risks lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and jeopardizes international non-proliferation efforts.

As numerous world-renowned physicists have stated, it is impossible for an earth penetrating weapon to bury itself deep enough to contain radioactive fallout. Use of such a weapon or of a smaller, low-yield weapon intended for the battlefield would cause immeasurable casualties among troops and civilians.

The need for new nuclear weapons is unfounded. The war in Iraq demonstrated the efficacy of precision guided conventional munitions to destroy targets and weapons, and the United States already maintains an arsenal of more than 10,000 nuclear warheads. Of these, 6,000 are deployed strategic weapons and nearly 1,000 are tactical weapons (of which more than 100 are deployed throughout Europe). Over 3,000 warheads remain in reserve. Development of new nuclear weapons could create a justification for the resumption of nuclear testing, which would further encourage proliferation.

The United States must lead the world in non-proliferation efforts. Expansion of its own nuclear program will do nothing to discourage rogue states such as North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons and may encourage U.S. allies to initiate new research and development within their own nuclear programs.

At the end of the Fiscal Year 2005 budget process, the Congress removed funding for new nuclear weapons programs as part of an omnibus appropriations bill. This was a significant victory for proponents of non-proliferation. However, the Administration is expected to attempt to restore the funding in FY2006 and will apply greater pressure on Congress to reinstate these programs.

Recommendations the Center supports:

Reject funding for new nuclear weapons programs in the FY2006 budget process.
Shift focus to improving and expanding conventional weapons for destroying deeply buried targets, such as suspected chemical and biological weapons laboratories.
Reassert the United States’ commitment to reducing its nuclear stockpile at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.