S. Hrg. 107-124
THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM AND THE SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 5, 2001
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Cilluffo, Frank J., senior policy analyst, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, DC...................... 86
Prepared statement........................................... 89
Henderson, Donald A., MD, MPH, director, Center for Civilian
Biodefense Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.... 62
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Heymann, David. L., MD, executive director, Communicable
Diseases, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland....... 70
Prepared statement........................................... 73
Ikle, Dr. Fred C., distinguished scholar, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, DC...................... 59
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Nunn, Hon. Sam, co-chair and chief executive officer, Nuclear
Threat Initiative, Washington, DC.............................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Woolsey, Hon. R. James, former Director of Central Intelligence,
and partner, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC.................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 30
(iii)
THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM AND THE SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:00 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Rockefeller,
Helms and Lugar.
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
National security, to state the obvious, is the first
obligation of every government. And the test of how well we
meet that obligation is whether whatever action we take makes
us more or less secure in the end.
There are some very difficult decisions with hard choices
relating to strategic doctrine, foreign policy, threat
assessment and economic constraints that every President and
every government has to face.
And just as we would all agree that we would provide for
the health care of all if we had unlimited funds, when there
are not unlimited funds we have to make difficult choices. We
have to make the same kinds of decisions in terms of our
national security.
One aspect of our sacred responsibility to our fellow
citizens, to provide for the physical security of our Armed
Forces and to protect our homeland, is how we go about this
process.
This is the first in a series of hearings on what have been
termed ``Homeland Defense and Protecting U.S. Military
Forces,'' where we will focus on the threats to our homeland
and attempt to assess what those threats are and prioritize
them to be able to make rational recommendations to our
colleagues.
These hearings have taken on an added sense of urgency in
my view for two reasons: The most ominous reason is there
appears to be an overwhelming focus, I would subjectively
characterize as a myopic focus, on national missile defense by
the Bush administration.
We appear to be about to jettison 50 years of strategic
doctrine grounded on three basic principles: One, reduce the
number of nuclear weapons in the world and prevent
proliferation to other countries; Two, stop all nuclear weapons
testing, because only with new testing can new weapons of mass
destruction be developed. And the United States is far ahead of
the game.
And, Three, diminish or eliminate the reliance on those
nuclear weapons which are most vulnerable and therefore the
least stable because they are most likely to be used on short
warning. These have been at least three of the basic principles
of our strategic doctrine for the last five decades.
But, for example on August 16, Secretary Rumsfeld told the
``Lehrer News Hour'' that he didn't care if other countries
responded to a U.S. missile defense by MIRV'ing or re-MIRV'ing
their ICBMs. He added, ``What really counts is the total number
of weapons.''
In doing so, the Secretary threw out decades of rightful
concern over crisis stability which lead to the landmark
efforts by the Reagan and Bush administrations to get the
Soviet Union to give up MIRVed ICBMs. In the interest of
missile defense, Secretary Rumsfeld reduced our nuclear
strategy to a simple numbers game.
Later last month, Under Secretary of State Bolton suggested
that we might withdraw from the ABM Treaty if President Putin
does not agree by November to scrap the treaty.
Russian officials had publicly declared their willingness
to amend the ABM Treaty. But obviously an amendment does
nothing.
The administration and Mr. Bolton then tried to walk back
his comments. Maybe they realized the United States won't win
any friends by rejecting Russian proposals when we have none of
our own, especially on offensive force reductions, which
President Bush and President Putin agreed were tied to the
issue of missile defense.
But I have yet to hear any serious U.S. proposals or any
rational explanation of why we cannot amend the ABM Treaty to
permit the testing that the administration wants conducted. And
just this weekend there was a bit of a flap in the press--a
number of national press people questioned me, and I'm sure the
rest of my colleagues, on press reports the administration is
willing to let China MIRV its ICBMs and let it resume nuclear
testing in response to a missile defense deployment.
The Chinese build-up may, in my view, spark a new arms race
involving India and Pakistan. But our withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty, the end of the START process and renewed nuclear
testing seems to be something that the administration may be
willing to pay in order to be able to move forward with an
untested, undeclared national missile defense.
A few months ago, and I don't want to get in the middle of
this but there is a former famous Senator who may testify today
who warned against making missile defense an issue of theology.
Looking at recent administration actions, I'm beginning to
wonder whether we run into theology or technology.
The second reason for a sense of urgency of these hearings
is the state of the budget. We are not where we were 15 months
ago with a large surplus. The loss of the surplus and the lack
of funding have created new impairments.
It was at least theoretically possible 18 months ago to
meet all our defense needs. But because of the state of the
economy and arguably some action taken to reduce the surplus,
that is no longer possible. So we have to now prioritize.
And we still have no reliable estimates on the full cost of
national missile defense, but we know that they range from $60
billion to hundreds of billions of dollars to develop the
systems contemplated by the Bush administration and the last
administration.
Obviously, we don't have enough money to do everything. The
estimates for the 10-year cost for modernizing our conventional
forces range from $250 to $650 billion over 10 years. So these
are the two reasons for the urgency of these hearings.
Hopefully, when we finish our hearings we'll have a much
clearer understanding of the needs we face and which we should
address first.
Today's hearing will focus on the threat of bioterrorism
and the holes in our homeland defense policy when it comes to
combating this threat. We begin with two expert panels on two
closely linked issues: Bioterrorism and the spread of
infectious disease.
Our globalized world, where people and goods constantly
move across borders, is a perfect breeding ground for the
spread of disease, whether from natural epidemics or
bioterrorism. It would seem to me, and I'm sure the testimony
we will hear today will address this, that any steps we take
against the threat of biological terrorism could reap benefits
in medical efforts to slow future infectious disease epidemics
and vice versa.
An improved public health system in the United States would
help address this great national security threat as well. But
make no mistake, a biological weapon smuggled across a border
and the spread of infectious disease are very real threats.
This hearing will give us insight into how well prepared we
are to engage those threats and what we need to do if we are
not fully prepared, and hopefully we'll have some estimate of
the costs of doing all this.
Our first panel will focus on the truly harrowing
consequences that a bioterrorist attack would have on our
people and indeed on our democratic political system. Former
Senator Sam Nunn and former Director of Central Intelligence
Jim Woolsey have participated in a chilling simulated exercise
called ``Dark Winter.''
I wish we had the time, and maybe we will see parts of the
CD-ROM they produced from that exercise. As I'm sure both
Senator Nunn and Mr. Woolsey will emphasize, ``Dark Winter''
was a nightmare scenario exposing serious flaws in our public
health infrastructure's ability to deal with a major disease,
whether it be a smallpox attack or a flu epidemic.
I reviewed that scenario last night, and I can tell you
that it is harrowing. It was frightening not just for the many,
many people around the world who could be felled by a
biological weapons attack. Perhaps even more frightening was
the risk that if we do not prepare rationally for such an awful
event, we may put our democracy at risk.
Our witnesses are: Dr. D.A. Henderson, director of Johns
Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies; Dr. David
Heymann, executive director of Communicable Diseases at the
World Health Organization; and the Honorable Fred Ikle, former
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who
is now a distinguished scholar at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies; and Frank Cilluffo, senior policy
analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Before hearing our first panel, I would like to make part
of the record two letters to the committee, one by Dr. Joshua
Lederberg, a Nobel Laureate and noted expert in infectious
disease, and the other by Dr. John Mekalanos, chairman of the
Department of Microbiology and Molecular Genetics at Harvard
University.
These two scientists are among the most accomplished
microbiologists and infectious disease experts in the world.
Dr. Lederberg's letter is actually a primmer on what he calls,
``a matter of transcendent importance to our security and to
global human welfare.''
He warns that biological weapons are ``Probably the most
perplexing and gravest security challenge we face.'' But he
approaches that challenge with both clarity and wisdom. Listen
to his description of the dilemma dealing with a biological
weapons attack. ``The organization of government to deal with
mass contingencies is a vexing and still poorly attended
problem. It entails the coordination of local, state and
Federal assets and jurisdictions; the intersection of law
enforcement, national security and public health; and a time of
crisis is not the best venue for quarrels over responsibility
and authority, over who will pay for it.
``Our main bulwark against direct large-scale attack is a
combination of civic harmony and firm retaliation against
egregious transgressors.``
Dr. Lederberg also discusses the role that primary
prevention, including strengthening of our intelligence
capabilities, should play in any response.
Dr. Mekalanos presents his findings on the emergence of new
infectious agents in nature and the import of the advances in
microbiology on the threat posed by bioterrorism.
If, God forbid, America should ever be attacked by
biological weapons, it will be the scientists and the public
health professionals on the front lines, not just our men and
women in uniform. And it's the scientists and public health
officials, as well as state and local governments and public
services, who will have to be fully prepared to engage the
enemy, whomever it is and whatever it is.
On the other hand, U.S. military must have the ability to
detect, survive, and maintain operations during biological
attack. It must also be prepared to assist at home in ways that
buttress, rather than undermine, the authority of state and
local officials.
I said that God forbid we should ever be attacked in this
manner. But the truth is that such an attack is more likely
today than it ever had been in the past, and that the
comparable natural epidemic is all too possible in the decades
to come.
In my view, the threat from anonymously delivered
biological weapons and from emerging infectious disease simply
dwarfs the threat that we will be attacked by a Third World
ICBM with a return address. I'm not suggesting anyone else
agrees with me on that. That is just my view.
Whether you agree or disagree with that judgment, however,
it is clear that bioterrorism and infectious diseases are real
threats that demand our attention now. Because there are steps
that we can realistically take now to contain them.
If we can come to grips today with the implications of that
reality, then this may be the most important hearing we hold
this year.
In ending my statement, let me exercise a point of personal
privilege, actually, two. When Senator Nunn was the Chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, he and I put together a little
piece of legislation on antiterrorism. And I can just remember,
Sam, the difficulty we had and the inability we had,
notwithstanding the consensus we thought we had, to deal with
the little thing called posse comitatus and how we were going
to deal with weapons of mass destruction, the role of the
military in dealing with them in a domestic attack that was a
terrorist attack.
If I just think of that one debate, that one debate, the
concerns you have all raised in ``Dark Winter'' make that one
concern pale by comparison.
[The letters referred to by Chairman Biden follow:]
Joshua Lederberg, University Professor-Emeritus,
The Rockefeller University,
1230 York Ave., New York, NY, August 30, 2001.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
221 Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Biden:
I am honored to have the opportunity to address you and your
committee by means of this letter, on a matter of transcendent
importance to our security, and to global human welfare. I refer to the
threat of use and proliferation of (micro)biological weapons, which
will be almost irresistible temptations to malignant persons and
states, who would otherwise be intimidated by the U.S. preeminence in
wealth and military technology.
To structure your perusal, my outline will be as follows.
<bullet> definition, historical note, and assessment of scope of the
BW threat
<bullet> Countermeasures: diplomatic
<bullet> defensive preparations
<bullet> deterrence and intelligence
<bullet> primary prevention; our clean hands
<bullet> inspiring global convergence on health as human aim
<bullet> Definition, historical note, and assessment of scope of the BW
threat
I will define biological warfare as the use of agents of disease
for hostile purposes. This embraces attacks on human health and
survival, but extends also to plant and animal crops. Far from vague
speculation, BW was the focus of billion dollar investments, both by
the U.S. and the USSR until President Nixon's unilateral abjuration in
1969. This was followed by the negotiation, ratification and coming
into force (in 1975) of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This
is a categorical ban of the development, production or use of BW.
The cardinal features of BW are outlined in attached Table 1.
Most important are:
low cost and ease of access
difficulty of detection, even after use, until disease has
advanced
unreliable but open-ended scale of predictable casualties
per kilogram of weapon the potential lives lost match nuclear
but would need far less costly and sophisticated technology
clandestine stockpiles and delivery systems--the proverbial
suitcase
perhaps concealed in a bale of marijuana.
Published citations to intelligence estimates would place up to a
dozen countries in the camp of BW-developers. Considerable harm could
be done (on the scale of, say, a thousand casualties) by rank amateurs.
Terrorist groups, privately or state-sponsored, with funds up to $1
million, could mount massive attacks of 10 or 100 times that scale.
Important to keep in mind: if the ultimate casualty roster is 1000,
there will have been 100,000 or 1,000,000 people at risk in the target
zone, legitimately demanding prophylactic attention, and in turn a
draconian triage. Several exercises have given dramatic testimony to
how difficult would be governmental management of such incidents, and
the stresses on civil order that would follow from inevitable
inequities in that management.
The short bottom line is that, in the current world where major
states sustain some equilibrium through mutual deterrence, and positive
shared interests, BW offers opportunity for grave harm on the part of
lesser actors. Relative to the assets and doctrinal insights available,
BW is probably the most perplexing and gravest security challenge we
face.
<bullet> Countermeasures: diplomatic
President Nixon's abjuration of BW as a U.S. military weapon, in
1969, set in motion the most important diplomatic and legal steps
towards the eradication of BW globally, laying the groundwork for the
BWC treaty. The BWC lacks robust verification machinery, mainly for
reasons intrinsic to the technology, and as well that certain parties
to the BWC have no intention of complying with it. But BW verification
is not the foundation of our own no-BW stance; the U.S. has long since
abandoned the idea that it need or would respond in kind to BW attack.
Were it not for the BWC we would have seen a gradually escalating
technology race, amplifying even further BW's threat to human
existence. The BWC does set a consensually, or at least rhetorically,
agreed standard of behavior: namely, it has become institutionalized
into international law, and infractions open the door to enforcement.
Further verification provisions would do little to enhance our actual
knowledge of those infractions: they would nevertheless have important
symbolic value in reaffirming international attachment to the
principles of the BWC. At minimum it behooves us to exercise creative
leadership in developing alternative means of bolstering that
reaffirmation.
The real problem with the BWC is less verification than it is
enforcement. We have all but certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein has
continued Iraq's (grudgingly admitted) BW development program, the main
sore point in his squabbles with the UN. (We can hardly be certain that
his nuclear program has not been revitalized, though that would be more
difficult, and from his perspective possibly redundant.) We have failed
to convince our allies, much less the diffident ``neutrals'' and
potential adversaries, that halting Iraq's BW is worth turning their
back on his oil contracts. To convince them of what is at stake we may
have to start with elevating the priority we give to the BW threat
generally. We must also become more knowledgeable about the local
political and cultural terrain, and more ingenious in the design of
punitive and compellent sanctions that will persuade Saddam of his
errors without undue hardship to the Iraqi population that he also
victimizes! That would carry us further with the international
consortia in which we have to invest political capital (and not waste
it in other tangents) to be sure this major threat is quenched. If
Saddam does develop and effectively use BW even in a purely regional
context (the most likely), that will not only be a humanistic
catastrophe; it is unlikely we will ever restore the principle of
mutual forbearance in resorting to BW.
Our public diplomacy is predicated on the stated proposition that
the use of BW is an offense to civilized mankind. That is a major
accomplishment of the BWC. It needs to be reaffirmed as well in the
attention we give to our own defense, as well as to our stern responses
to significant infractions in any quarter.
<bullet> Defensive preparations
BW threat mitigation is indispensable, so as not to present
irresistible temptations to mischief makers, for whom interstate
deterrence is irrelevant. Unlike the aftermath of a nuclear or high
explosive bombardment, BW attack is amenable to interventions for some
hours or days after the event, depending on the agent used. With the
best popularized BW agent, anthrax, at feasible dose levels the
administration of appropriate antibiotics can protect the majority of
those exposed. The other side of the coin is the urgency of recognizing
the syndrome within hours of the earliest symptoms. Biosensors are
being developed that can be used to confirm suspicions of anthrax. For
some decades, we will have to rely on early diagnosis of the first
human (or animal) cases to have the basis for focussing those sensors.
As a wide list of diseases are in the picture, this entails nothing
more nor less than reinvigorating our overall public health
infrastructure. In contrast to the explosive rise of health care
expenditures--with universal access to ever more technically
sophisticated health care--public health has been allowed to languish,
boosted only very recently by public arousal about emerging infections
and about bioterrorism. That boost entails people and organizational
structures, but improvement also comes down to money--new money, as
well as the relabelling of established programs.
Besides the diagnostics, we need organizational and operational
doctrines that can confront unprecedented emergencies, we need trained
people on call, we need physical assets for logistics, isolation,
decontamination and care. We also need stockpiles of antibiotics and
vaccines appropriate to the risk--and before that, more careful
analysis of what kinds and how much we need. We need research on
treatment modalities--how we manage the care of inhalational anthrax
with possibly limited supplies of antibiotics (and which kinds?) is not
that well understood. And still more fundamental research could give us
sharper tools for diagnosis, and more usable ranges of antibacterial
and antiviral remedies.
The organization of government to deal with mass contingencies is a
vexing and still poorly attended problem. It entails the coordination
of local, state, and federal assets and jurisdictions; the intersection
of law enforcement, national security and public health; and a time of
crisis is not the best venue for quarrels over responsibility and
authority, over who will pay for it.
<bullet> Deterrence, intelligence and preemption
Our main bulwark against direct large scale attack is the
combination of a civic harmony, and firm retaliation against egregious
transgressors. It is sometimes said, we should not worry about BW
attacks, ``we'll just `nuke the perps' '' if they dare. Lacking the
clear provenience of a missile track to finger the aggressor, that puts
us at the mercy either of bafflement, or worse of calculated
disinformation as to the source. Good, I have to say better
intelligence is the key to retaliation, apprehension, and penal
containment and sanctions. This is technically unfamiliar territory for
most of the intelligence community; it has nevertheless taken many
positive steps, but it still has a long way to go, and once again is
resource-constrained compared to what goes on in the collection and
analysis against other more familiar threats.
A related vein of opportunity is found in the realm of cooperative
threat reduction. Since BW facilities can be so readily reconstituted,
it is less important in the long run to destroy production facilities,
even stockpiles, than it is to get toxic technical knowledge diverted
to constructive purposes. Former weapons scientists in Russia need
financial as well as moral encouragement to ply a new trade in vaccine
development and other constructive pursuits. This could benefit Russia,
and its circle of less developed countries directly, and thus enhance
security globally. The alternative is for some few of of the ex-
biowarriors to sell their knowledge, and who knows what range of
horrific bio-strains, to the highest bidders among the rogues. We do
have very modest programs in place: they should be expanded, not put at
risk for flimsy excuses as seems to be happening.
<bullet> Primary prevention; our clean hands
I have already alluded to public diplomacy (starting with firm
conviction at home) about the priority needed to be applied to averting
any successful BW attack. We have to be careful to behave ourselves
fully consistently with abhorrence at the idea of using disease as a
weapon. Such attributions will be lodged against the U.S. as part of
general America-bashing (witness the ongoing rumor campaign in Africa
that the U.S. government had somehow ``invented AIDS''). They will also
be excuses for continued simmering of the BW pot in other venues.
A particular dilemma is how to study the BW threats in detail, how
to develop vaccines and other countermeasures, without attracting such
accusations. I believe the executive and legislative branches could
develop models of entrusted transparency for oversight of such
necessary studies, both for assurance to global publics, and to be
certain there are no careless projects oblivious to the reputational or
physical harm they could inflict on our polity.
<bullet> Inspiring global convergence on health as human aim
The central premise of the BWC is that infectious disease is the
common enemy of all humankind; and it is a treasonable act to join with
that enemy.
Those motives clearly inspired adherence to the BWC, even on the
part of (smaller, poorer) countries who might otherwise exploit BW to
level a playing field as against a superpower. Having set aside BW as
giving small advantage and numerous migraines for our own military
power, we should count it fortunate that we share those interests and
conclusions. They can only be bolstered if we internalize that
ideology, and participate ever more fully in global campaigns for
health. The new funds for the scourges of AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis are right on the mark! Their levels to date are just
tokens--yes compare them to military hardware!--but certainly in the
right direction, and it's just about time we assumed leadership of that
vector among the nations cooperating with the WHO to bolster global
systems of surveillance of disease and coping with outbreaks that
promise to threaten all of us.
Besides the global humanitarian, political and economic virtues of
this newfound direction, there are good selfish motives as well. What
would it pay for us to invest to reduce the likelihood that another
AIDS will emerge from a distant continent, and cross the oceans to vex
us at home. There will be no stopping the birds, nor the frequent
flyers, from disseminating ever more novel risks needing that global
surveillance. I do not count West Nile virus as a likely major scourge,
but it is just one more exemplary warning!
Table 1--Germs as Arms: Basic Issues
_______________________________________________________________________
BW vs. CW: living germs vs. chemicals
might spread; unstable; self-amplify
Underlying science is unalterably dual use
licit defensive exploration
targetted against natural disease
Likewise production up to point of weaponization
vaccines vs. BW agents?
Facilities moderate scale; few external signatures
easily concealed or masked by licit programs
Weapons: potent, but unfamiliar and unreliable in military context
Tactical defense is easy: physical barriers (masks, suits)
Latent period up to 36 hours. Disease may be treatable
Hence focus on civil health preparedness
Hardly understood until now, these are strategic weapons.
. . . At same time, accessible to small powers . . . or groups
Seen as answer to a Superpower self confident about the
``revolution in military
affairs''.
Capabilities can scarcely be denied
remedial and intelligence focus on intentions
_______________________________________________________________________
______
Statement Submitted by John J. Mekalanos, Ph.D.
Dear Honorable Committee Members:
Thank you for inviting me to comment on the related issues of
biological terrorism and the threat of emerging infectious diseases to
the security of the United States. I feel qualified to speak on these
topics because of my scientific background. In brief, I have over 27
years of experience in infectious disease research and currently serve
as Professor and Chairman of the Department of Microbiology and
Molecular Genetics at Harvard Medical School. Our Department consists
of a group of outstanding investigators dedicated to understanding and
controlling bacterial and viral diseases.
Although awareness of the dangers posed by biological warfare (BW)
has increased significantly in recent years, it is my belief that we
are still far from prepared to contend with a biological weapons
attack. There are many reasons for this, and numerous analyses over the
past few years have examined the issues carefully. This letter is
intended to provide a brief overview of the scientific aspects of
biological weapons development, as perceived from the point of view of
microbiological research. I also want to emphasize that many of my
comments about BW threats also apply broadly to threats that we face
from nature. We have seen numerous examples of this recently: a new
highly lethal strain of flu virus, a mysterious prion, multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis, HIV, and malaria. Obviously, we are and will
continue to be under constant assault by emerging microbes whose origin
may be natural but whose spread to the U.S. will take full advantage of
modern modes of travel, new human activities, and increased population
density.
To begin with, biological weapons are comparatively inexpensive and
simple to manufacture. They are therefore accessible and attractive to
those that lack sufficient means to pursue costlier weapons programs.
One estimate suggests that a significant biological arsenal could be
produced with as little as $10,000 worth of equipment, though other
studies have questioned the potential lethality of material produced by
such rudimentary operations. Construction of the most sophisticated BW
agents would indeed require significant scientific skills and
equipment. However, the fact remains that the production of biological
weapons is not as limited by technical expertise as that of other
weapons. For example, it is fairly easy to introduce new antibiotic
resistance genes into bacteria. This does not require extensive
technical training, and the relevant methods and materials are widely
available from even commercial vendors. Because the medical community
is already struggling with the appearance of multi-antibiotic
resistant, clinically important microbes, even a simple genetic
manipulation such as transferring a single critical antibiotic
resistance gene into a single pathogen could have extremely serious
consequences.
As far as initial acquisition of pathogens by unscrupulous parties
is concerned, it would not be exceptionally difficult to obtain
pathogenic strains. Microbial samples are transferred between labs on a
daily basis in the normal course of biomedical or pharmaceutical
research. It is fortunately not so simple for unauthorized personnel to
acquire highly pathogenic strains, as traffic in these is regulated
carefully, but it is certainly possible for determined individuals to
acquire less virulent strains by fraudulent means or theft. These
strains could then be genetically modified to increase their
pathogenicity, though this would probably require a higher level of
scientific training as well as a longer period of development. Efforts
along these lines were vigorously pursued in the former Soviet Union,
and since its dissolution, their experts have likely been recruited to
a variety of rogue states that openly threaten the U.S. and its allies.
Biological research activity is currently growing at a tremendous
rate, and although the potential contribution to human welfare is
enormous, it is simultaneously providing additional tools that could be
used for the construction and delivery of more powerful pathogens. Much
of the information that is being generated by biological researchers is
publicly available, either in print or via the Internet. The ease with
which any individual can access data relevant to the genetic
engineering of pathogenic organisms can only be expected to increase in
the future.
Although the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 was
ratified by 140 countries, there is no real mechanism for verifying
compliance. Monitoring is particularly difficult since many of the
components of a biological weapons program can also be used in fully
legitimate pursuits. Apparatus employed in the manufacture of food
products such as yogurt or beer could be used to grow pathogenic
cultures, and yet it hardly seems practical to apply the same stringent
restrictions to beer fermenting equipment as to material that is of
demonstrable military sensitivity (e.g., explosives or nuclear
technology). It is useful in this situation to recall the much-
discussed bombing of a baby milk factory in Iraq during the 1990-91
Gulf War. The facility was destroyed because it was suspected of
producing biological weapons. I personally am not able to judge whether
this facility made baby formula or biological weapons components at any
point in time, but this illustrates the potential for confusion.
The conclusion is that it is certainly possible for small nations
or terrorist groups secretly to amass sufficient material to present a
biological threat, although the seriousness of the threat would depend
on the exact circumstances.
I think it is important at this time to point out that the results
of biological manipulation are sometimes difficult to predict, even for
highly trained professional scientists. Less than a year ago,
Australian researchers seeking to develop a biological contraceptive to
combat rodent infestation, inadvertently created a strain of mousepox
that was more virulent than the original parent strain. Considering
that this occurred in the context of perfectly well-intentioned
research that was intended to benefit humans, we would do well to
remember that the law of unintended consequences also applies to
malefactors. The chances of unwittingly creating a ``super-pathogen''
will only be increased by deliberate attempts to enhance an organism's
pathogenic potential, and there is no assurance whatsoever that even
the producers of such an agent would be able to control it.
Next, I will mention briefly what can be done to combat biological
warfare. Measures necessary for countering biological attacks can be
divided into several categories: surveillance and early warning
systems, treatment, and prevention. In this letter, discussion of
prevention will deal only with biological considerations such as
vaccine development and usage, since military concerns do not lie
within my area of expertise. I will also leave aside consideration of
pathogens that target agriculture, focusing instead on those that
affect humans directly.
Clinical surveillance and early warning measures are critical not
only because timely treatment of affected individuals often means the
difference between life and death, but also because infection must be
prevented from spreading to other individuals and regions. Depending on
the actual agent employed, the impact of a biological weapon can extend
far beyond the initial point of attack. This is especially true with
highly communicable agents (e.g., smallpox), but it applies to all
infectious agents that demonstrate a delayed onset of symptoms. Victims
may not know that they are infected and so not seek treatment or take
precautions against spreading the disease to others. Unfortunately, it
may be extremely difficult to detect an attack. Unlike nuclear or
chemical weapons, the delivery of biological agents need not be
accompanied by telltale explosions and could be quite stealthy. The
initial symptoms of bioweapons infections are often nonspecific, and
anthrax and smallpox are so rare in the U.S. that the majority of
physicians might not recognize even the characteristic symptoms of
these diseases. In addition, current systems for reporting cases of
infectious disease would likely not uncover the presence of a covert
attack before significant damage had occurred.
Treatment of BW victims typically consists of antibiotic or vaccine
therapy and supportive care. Obviously, this requires an adequate
supply of effective drugs and appropriate clinical facilities. In this
respect also, the U.S. is poorly prepared. Not only are there serious
logistical questions regarding distribution of drugs and supplies in a
crisis situation, but studies of U.S. hospital facilities have
concluded that there is significant pressure with regard to space and
staff. While this may not result in serious problems under typical
conditions, hospitals clearly cannot cope with epidemics.
Of all possible treatment strategies, preventive vaccines often
offer the most advantages. Since they can be administered in advance of
infection, and immunity may be long-lived, vaccines can to a great
extent alleviate the need for rapid diagnosis and administration of
therapeutic agents. Vaccines have certifiably saved millions of lives
and account for some of our greatest medical successes. Nevertheless,
preventive vaccines are not available for all diseases, and those that
are available may suffer from a variety of problems. For example, the
current anthrax vaccine must be administered in 6 doses over 18 months,
with annual boosters for prolonged protection. In this case,
development of immunity is slow and logistically complex. In addition,
there are insufficient quantities of existing vaccines. Recent reports
have described the rapid diminution of U.S. anthrax vaccine stocks, as
well as the delays and difficulties associated with obtaining more. It
has been estimated that the worldwide supply of smallpox vaccine is
only 60 million doses, and there is currently no facility for smallpox
vaccine production.
For these reasons, my opinion is that the U.S. medical
infrastructure is regrettably inadequate for dealing with biological
warfare.
Finally, I would like to call attention to the fact that the
legitimate development of therapies against biological agents is
extremely time-consuming. With any new medical treatment, exacting
rules are required to ensure safety and efficacy. This is absolutely
necessary and desirable, but those who intend to use biological weapons
offensively are of course not similarly constrained. This is not in any
way to argue against existing or future regulations regarding research,
but merely to emphasize the fact that offensive strategies are simpler
to develop than therapeutic or preventive ones. While exciting new
therapeutic approaches for treating infection by some of the more
important BW agents have been recently described, funding for their
development has been inadequate. This is in part because the usual
incentives that motivate the pharmaceutical industry are in many cases
lacking for such products. We have therefore all the more reason to
press forward on all fronts to provide adequate funding and resources
for all types of defensive measures against biological warfare and
infectious disease threats.
It is always far easier to cause harm than to prevent or treat it.
This is particularly well illustrated by the issues at hand. Throughout
human history, some of our finest and most impassioned efforts have
been devoted to the eradication of infectious disease. We have had many
brilliant successes, and yet infectious disease still accounts for
millions of deaths worldwide. Many of these occur in wealthy,
industrialized nations that possess the most advanced medical
infrastructures ever developed. Due to multi-drug resistance and the
emergence of new pathogens, plus the logistics of clinical treatment,
we are already facing difficult problems whose existence is
attributable solely to natural processes. How much more frightening is
it to contemplate the situations that may arise if conscious effort is
directed towards using infectious agents, which we have spent centuries
combating, for the dark purposes of mass destruction? Our hard-won
understanding of pathogens is helping us to meet the challenges of
infectious disease, but it can easily be overwhelmed under
circumstances that are alarmingly possible. We must always be vigilant
regarding all aspects of biological weapons development and the threat
posed by infectious diseases, or we will certainly be punished by the
direst of consequences.
The Chairman. In another point of personal privilege, and
I'll have more to say at an appropriate time, but I want to say
a brief word about an announcement made by Senator Helms just
last month.
Jesse, I know I speak for the members of this committee and
all whom have ever worked with you that we know there's another
15 months fortunately we are going to get to work together, but
that assuming, and I am speaking only for myself and I'm back
here, and that's not at all certain whether my constituency
will decide that that is going to happen, it will be a very
different place, a less friendly place, and a less
accommodating place without you being here.
I have truly enjoyed working with you. I think it's been to
the surprise and to some chagrin of your supporters and mine
that we have such a close personal friendship. I remember
telling the press when I chose to take over the ranking
position on this committee for the Democratic Party and leaving
Judiciary in that position, that you and I will get along very
well.
And the press, both national and local, were incredulous.
They thought that was not possible. Not only did we know it was
possible, we had done it for 26 years prior to that. And I'm
happy of one thing, Jesse, and that is all those who follow
politics can see that we can disagree in this place without
being disagreeable. You have been one of my close friends. You
continue to be.
And I'm truly going to miss, assuming that I am back, I'm
truly going to miss having you as a colleague.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I feel the same
way about you. And I just take a note there are three members
of the Class of 1972 here today: You and Sam Nunn and I. We are
glad to see you, Sam.
Well, anybody who might draw the foolish conclusion that
this is a routine hearing maybe got a wake-up call with an item
hidden on page umpteen of the paper the other day about Russia
developing a new anthrax virus for possible delivery to other
nations.
Mr. Chairman, I'm grateful, therefore, for your having
scheduled this hearing this morning. It's very important;
because the threat of bioterrorism is very real, and it is
growing as is evident by the things we have seen almost every
day.
This threat is driven by the increasing capabilities and
the violent intentions of rogue states and terrorist groups
seeking to harm the United States or to make themselves able to
do so.
Now, the sooner this very real peril is recognized, the
sooner we can begin to deal with it in a more direct and
deliberate way. These issues are of enormous importance.
How the United States prepares to deal with the
consequences of an attack employing deadly viruses and toxins
would impact countless thousands and possibly millions of
lives. And planning for such catastrophe is obviously an
essential government responsibility.
However, I would much prefer to prevent and defend against
the threat in the first place rather than to have to deal with
the chaos and the death and destruction after the fact. And I
know that is a common feeling among all of us.
A bioterrorism attack can be prevented, but it requires
strong export control and nonproliferation regimes. Both are
essential to ensure that terrorist groups and rogue states
cannot acquire the technology and the know-how to build and
deliver these horrible weapons so dangerous to the United
States.
For that reason I am disappointed that the Senate is now
considering the Export Administration Act, legislation designed
to liberalize our national security export controls. That will
obviously do great harm to our national security by assisting
countries like Communist China to modernize their military,
improve their strategic capabilities, and facilitate the
dangerous proliferation of ballistic missile and other weapons
of mass destruction technologies to rogue nations be it Iraq,
Iran, North Korea or whomever.
It is important that we never lose sight of the fact that
the United States and our allies can prevent a bioterrorism
attack with a robust missile defense system. I may be a voice
crying in the political wilderness about this, but I firmly
believe it.
A missile defense system can provide three benefits. No. 1,
it can deter rogue nations from building ballistic missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; No. 2, it
can prevent rogue nations from threatening the United States
and/or our allies; and, No. 3, it can shoot down these missiles
if they are ever used against the United States or our allies.
Iran, Iraq and North Korea are among many others that are
building long-range missiles. A report this past January by the
National Intelligence Council indicated that these same nations
are also actively pursuing biological warfare capabilities.
Some have already weaponized these deadly pathogens and
placed them in missile warheads. They are doing all of this to
threaten and to blackmail and to intimidate the United States
and our allies by exploiting our greatest vulnerability--which
is our lack of ballistic missile defense.
Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee and those
listening elsewhere, we must avoid the false choices that are
so often presented to policymakers, for example that some of
these threats are more likely than others and therefore that
they demand the lion's share of resources. I disagree with
that.
When it comes to America's security, we must be prepared to
deal with all threats. We must not continue to spend nearly $10
billion a year to combat terrorism and defend against weapons
of mass destruction while we are spending far less annually on
a national missile defense.
To this end I'm convinced that the Bush administration's
decision to spend more on missile defense is the right decision
and that Congress should unhesitatingly support this decision.
The American people I think expect no less and would surely ask
embarrassing questions in the aftermath of an attack, if the
people were to discover that their government had had the means
in the first place to defend them but did not choose to do so.
I'm grateful to our witnesses for being here today. And I
look forward to their testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. What we'll do is we'll
start off. Hopefully we'll be able to have more than one quick
round but with 7-minute rounds see if we can get through
everyone first and ask questions. Because everyone is anxious
to hear what you have to say.
Senator Nunn, the floor is yours, and welcome back.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, CO-CHAIR AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, DC
Senator Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator
Helms, let me join Senator Biden in thanking you for your
service to the United States Senate and to our country. It was
a great pleasure for me to be elected at the same time as you
and Senator Biden were, and when I look around the committee
and I see relative newcomers, like Senator Dick Lugar, it
reminds me of the Class of 1972.
In a matter of interest, Jim Woolsey, my companion here at
the table was the General Counsel of the Armed Services
Committee when I arrived. So really we have four of us here
that were there at that stage. Of course it's a great pleasure
for me to be before this committee and come back to an
institution that I truly love and have spent a great deal of my
life in.
So to you and Senator Biden and Senator Lugar and Senator
Hagel and Senator Boxer, thank you for having us and thank you
for focusing on this very important subject.
The Chairman. I don't understand why you didn't thank
Senator Rockefeller. He's in a different county down there.
Senator Nunn. I see him. He's down at the end. A man with
that much wisdom I thought would be closer to the front of the
table.
But Senator Helms, I know how hard it is to decide to leave
voluntarily. I'm sure that you have been through a lot of your
thinking. But my very best to you and your whole family.
Senator Helms. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Nunn. Biological terrorism, Mr. Chairman, is one of
our greatest national security threats--one that cannot be
addressed by the Department of Defense standard operating
procedures. The specter of a biological weapons attack and the
parallel peacetime threat of a naturally occurring infectious
disease outbreak--I want to emphasize that these two go
together.
The things we need to do to protect against bioterrorism
are also things we need to do with our public health system,
even if we never have a bioterrorist attack.
These are unique challenges and they deserve the time and
focus you are devoting to them today.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms, members of the committee, as
you may know this past June at Andrews Air Force Base I was a
participant in the exercise ``Dark Winter'' which simulated a
biological weapons attack on the United States. It's a lucky
thing for the United States that this was just a test and not a
real emergency.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, our lack of
preparation is a real emergency from my perspective. I think my
colleague Jim Woolsey will agree with that.
``Dark Winter'' simulated a series of national security
meetings dealing with a terrorist attack involving the covert
release of smallpox in three American cities. The exercise was
conducted by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies, and the ANSER Institute for Homeland Defense, under
the leadership of John Hamre, Tara O'Toole and Randy Larsen,
respectively.
Many of the participants in ``Dark Winter'' had served
previous Presidents in cabinet or sub-cabinet positions. And
most knew how the NSC, the National Security Council, worked.
They were all individuals with considerable experience and
perspective in either the security field, law enforcement field
or the health field or the emergency field.
I will not take the committee's time with charts. I planned
to do that at one time but then I started looking at the time
and I know we want the time to discuss the conclusions. I
decided to just try to briefly summarize this but the charts
and CD-ROM are available. And I'll just cover the highlights
this morning.
In the opening minutes of ``Dark Winter,'' we learned from
the Secretary of Health and Human Services that cases of
smallpox had been diagnosed by the Center for Disease Control.
Given the infectious nature of the disease, we were facing the
start of a smallpox epidemic, an event with devastating, if not
catastrophic potential.
Like all of you, I received a smallpox vaccination when I
was a child. But I had forgotten the horror of the disease. In
the 20th century, more than 300 million people died from
smallpox; more than those killed in all the wars of the century
combined, which is an astounding figure.
Thanks to a massive and highly collaborative international
health campaign, smallpox as a naturally occurring disease was
eradicated. But once eradicated, the consequences of an
outbreak of smallpox today are more dangerous because each
passing year brings generations of unvaccinated citizens and
also citizens who have been vaccinated whose vaccinations have
worn off, which would probably include all of us. So the
potency of the previous vaccinations have diminished with time.
Unfortunately, we know that smallpox was made into a weapon
by the Soviet Union. What we don't know is whether other
nations or groups either derived some smallpox from the Soviet
Union or whether they have pursued a similar goal with success.
And this should be a matter of keen intelligence focused by
this committee as well as other committees.
Over a 24-hour period at Andrews Air Force Base, our
National Security Council ``war gamers'' dealt with 3 weeks of
simulated shock, stress and horror. I was given the role of
President of the United States, and I wouldn't describe it in
this case as being an honor.
Jim Woolsey was my Director of Central Intelligence. I'm
sure he was frustrated too. I said to Jim several times that
what I got from him in that 18-hour period was an awful lot of
opinion and not one damn bit of intelligence. Nevertheless, he
did the best he could with the circumstances we had.
We learned that on December 9, 2002, some dozen patients
reported to the Oklahoma City Hospital with a strange illness
confirmed quickly by the CDC to be smallpox. While we only knew
about the Oklahoma cases the first day, we later learned the
scope of the initial infections and the sites of three
simultaneous attacks in shopping centers in Oklahoma, Georgia,
as well as Pennsylvania.
The initial infection quickly spread to five states and
three thousand victims, although most infected individuals had
not displayed symptoms or gone to the hospital in the first few
days. And we did not know at that time how many had been
infected.
We didn't know how many. We didn't know how, how many there
were. We didn't know where they were. We didn't know who they
were. We did know that probably many people had been infected.
We quickly learned we had only two tools available to deal
with a smallpox attack: vaccination and isolation. And we had
only enough vaccine for 1 out of every 23 Americans, which is
the state today.
At the very beginning of the National Security Council
meeting, I denied the Secretary of Defense's adamant demand
that all 2.3 million U.S. military personnel be immediately
vaccinated wherever they were in the world.
Instead, we administered the vaccine to U.S. military,
including the National Guard and security and medical personnel
who were on the front lines locally, and who also were in areas
of the world where a smallpox attack was most likely to occur.
We could not allow all the vaccine to go to the military
right off the bat, or at least 2.3 million which would be
probably one fourth, one third of the total supply, because the
front line shifted. It wasn't the battlefield. It was back
home.
The troops that were engaged were most of all medical
personnel whether they were local or whether they were military
or whether they were shipped in on emergency from around the
country or the world.
Our initial decision was to use our limited supply of
vaccine to protect health care workers, local police and fire
officials, National Guard on the scene and local, state and
federal officials who were in the line of fire.
We also devised a strategy to try and put a firewall around
the infections that were being reported. But that strategy was
largely ineffective because of the rapid spread of the disease.
Because we didn't know where it had spread, where they were,
and because we had a very limited supply of vaccine. If you had
enough vaccine, you could put fire breaks around every
suspicious area.
The Chairman. Senator, would you for the record indicate if
you can how the disease is spread?
Senator Nunn. It's spread from person to person.
The Chairman. Physical contact?
Senator Nunn. The health experts tell me that you
basically--through breathing. Doesn't have to be direct
contact, in close proximity. And the health officials tell me
that until you actually show some signs, you can't really
spread the disease. But showing signs, a lot of people confuse
it with other things so they don't know they have got it to
begin with.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Nunn. On the first night of decisionmaking, Mr.
Chairman, we designed a vaccination strategy. And we ordered
accelerated production of new stock. We ordered it on an
emergency basis.
We asked the Secretary of State to call his counterparts
around the globe and try to find supplies in other countries
and began to feel other countries out about whether they would
engage with us in trying to stop the disease before it spread
all over the world.
I will skip the agonizing details now and get on to the
conclusions. On day 6 of the crisis, we had very little vaccine
left. We quickly faced the only alternative, forced isolation,
with large numbers of exposed citizens whose locations and
identities remained guesswork. We were down to really tough
questions.
Do we force whole communities and cities to stay in their
homes? How? With force? How much force? Does it include lethal
force? Do we physically prevent citizens in high risk areas
from fleeing their communities with their children even though
they themselves may already be infected?
Who provides food and care for those in forced isolation,
particularly when we can no longer provide vaccine to the
essential providers? Who's going to make the health care people
show up when you don't have any vaccine for them and for their
families?
On day 12 when our war game ended and my brief tenure as
President concluded, we were beginning the next stage of the
epidemic, those who caught smallpox from the original 3,000
people who were infected in the initial terrorist attack. Our
health experts told us that every 2 to 3 weeks the number of
cases would increase ten-fold.
To give you a glimpse of how the exercise ended, here are a
few highlights from a simulated CNN broadcast quoting that.
On day 12 of the worst public health crisis in
America's history, demonstrations for more vaccine in
hard-hit communities disintegrated into riots and
looting around the nation. Interstate commerce has
stopped in several regions of the nation. A suspension
of trading on America's stock exchanges takes effect
tomorrow. International commerce with the United States
has virtually ceased. The Centers for Disease Control
reports that efforts to stem the smallpox epidemic have
depleted America's inventory of smallpox vaccine. While
the CDC may be out of vaccine, at least 45 Internet Web
sites are offering what they claim are safe, effective
vaccines from previously forgotten stocks. These claims
have not, repeat not, been independently verified, and
authorities urge serious caution.
At least 25 more states and 10 foreign countries are
reporting smallpox infections. At the United Nations,
China has sponsored a resolution to censure the United
States, blaming America for reintroducing smallpox to
the world. It is demanding that the United States
supply the world with vaccine.
I could go on and on, Mr. Chairman, but that I think
captures the essence of what we were faced with. In summary, I
determined from that experience that public health has become a
national security issue and that we are unprepared.
We were out of vaccine. We were discussing martial law.
Interstate commerce was eroding rapidly. The members of our
simulated NSC, as well as state and local officials, were
desperate.
We came to realize too late that our country had not
produced sufficient vaccine; had not prepared top officials to
cope with this new type of security crisis; had not invested
adequately in the planning and exercises absolutely necessary
for coordinated response; had not ensured that the public
health infrastructure was adequate, with built-in surge
capacity; had not educated the American people on developed
strategies to constructively engage the media in educating the
public about what was happening and what they could do to
protect their families; had not practiced what few plans there
were in place; had not ranked biological terrorism or
infectious diseases as high national priorities.
Before I detail the lessons learned in this particular
exercise, we should keep in mind that the results of biological
effect would vary greatly according to the specific agent used.
Technology and training for early recognition of the type of
pathogen, that kind of training and technology is absolutely
essential and must be a high priority.
This exercise gave us valuable lessons about a possible
smallpox attack. The circumstances would be very different in
the case of an anthrax attack. In the event of an attack using
anthrax, vaccination and isolation would not be the tools, but
antibiotics would need to be administered on the scene and in
large quantities immediately.
For the participants, the ``Dark Winter'' exercise
instilled in all of us that there is much work to be done and
needs to be done quickly.
Number 1, clearly measures that will deter or prevent
bioterrorism are the most cost-effective means to counter
threats to public health and social order. We need to prevent
the proliferation of biological weapons in part by
strengthening intelligence-gathering against such threats, but
also by providing peaceful research options to scientists in
the former Soviet Union who know how to make these pathogens
and who have had plenty of experience making these pathogens
but don't know how they are going to feed their children today
with legitimate enterprises.
Two, we need to focus more attention, concern and resources
on the specific threat of bioterrorism, understanding that it
is different from the other threats we face. Biological weapons
must be countered with new protocols for securing dangerous
pathogens with increased vigilance and surveillance, as well as
with increased supplies of medicines and vaccines and
significantly increased training.
Three, we need to recognize the central role of public
health and medicine in this effort and engage those
professionals fully as partners on the national security team.
We must act on the understanding that public health is an
important pillar in our national security framework.
Four, we need to identify and put into practice the
mechanisms by which all levels of government will interact and
work together. It is critical that we understand our differing
roles, responsibilities, capabilities and authorities, and plan
on how we will work together before an act of terrorism occurs.
I must add that Governor Frank Keating of Oklahoma was part of
this exercise. I think he will strongly echo that from a state
government and a local government point of view. He made a very
valuable contribution.
Five, we need to reexamine and modernize the legal
framework for epidemic control measures and the appropriate
balance with civil liberties. Mr. Chairman, your reminder on
posse comitatus is right down that line because there would be
all sorts of questions this society has not faced, at least in
modern times.
Six, there should be a clear plan for providing the news
media with timely and accurate information to help save lives
and prevent panic.
Seven, we need to increase the core capabilities of our
public health system to detect, track and contain epidemics by
providing resources for effective surveillance systems,
diagnostic laboratory facilities, and communication links to
other elements of the response effort here and abroad.
Eight, the national pharmaceutical stockpile must be built
to capacity, including extra production capability for drugs
and vaccines, with heightened security at various dispersal
sites. We must not fall victim to a twin attack that releases a
bioagent and simultaneously destroys our key drugs and vaccine
supplies.
Nine, we need to develop plans for a surge of patients in
the nation's hospitals to make the best use of existing
resources in the event of an emergency.
Ten, we need to increase funding for biomedical research to
develop new vaccines, new therapeutic drugs and new rapid
diagnostic tests for bioweapon agents.
Eleven, we need to encourage the scientific community to
confront the sinister potential of modern biological research,
and help them devise systems and practices that ensure the
safe, secure storage of and access to dangerous pathogens.
Twelve, officials at highest levels of the Federal, state,
and local government need to participate in exercises like this
one to understand the importance of advanced not only planning
but preparation. Plans must be exercised, evaluated and
understood by decisionmakers if they are to prove useful in a
time of crisis.
Mr. Chairman, finally, I have a new role now that relates
to what we call the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). It's a new
foundation funded by Ted Turner very generously and headed by a
board of experienced people including Senator Lugar among
others.
We are trying to encourage and help our government to
deter, prevent and defend against biological terrorism. That's
a central part of our mission as well as the nuclear side of it
and the chemical side of it.
We are dedicated to reducing the global threat from
biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons by increasing public
awareness, encouraging dialogue, catalyzing action, promoting
new thinking about these dangers in this country and around the
globe.
We fully recognize that only our government can provide the
leadership and resources to achieve our security and health
priorities. But within that context, NTI is seeking ways to
reduce the threat from biological weapons and their
consequences; exploring ways to increase education, awareness
and communication among public health experts, medical
professions, and scientists, as well as among policymakers and
elected officials.
We are considering ways to improve infectious disease
surveillance around the globe, including rapid and effective
detection, investigation, and response.
This is a fundamental defense against any infectious
disease threat, whether it occurs naturally or is released
deliberately, stimulating and supporting the scientific
community in its efforts to limit inappropriate access to
dangerous pathogens and to establish standards that will help
prevent the development and spread of biological agents as
weapons.
NTI is searching for ways to help our Government and the
Russian Government to facilitate the conversion of Russian
bioweapons facilities and know-how to peaceful purposes, and to
improve security of dangerous pathogens worldwide. And I know
that my colleague and partner Senator Lugar can well identify
with that because he has been right out in front in that
effort.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in concluding, enemies don't
normally attack us where we are strong; they target us where we
are weak. Enemies of the United States are not eager to engage
us militarily. They saw what happened in Desert Storm and other
conflicts in recent years, and they know the awesome
capabilities we have.
They will, however, attack us where they believe we are
vulnerable. Today, we are vulnerable to biological terrorism.
Those who perpetuate such an act are not likely to be quickly
identified or leave a return address. I emphasize that. That
makes a huge difference in terms of the incentives of the game.
It is critical that we prepare with all possible speed;
because if an attack occurs and succeeds, there will be others.
Preparing is deterring. Our first priority, as Senator Helms
mentioned, must be prevention.
Whether the enemy achieves its objectives in an attack that
may take place depends to a large extent on how the American
people respond. Panic in our citizens would be just as great a
danger as the disease itself.
Some citizens will respond like saints, doing whatever they
can to meet the needs of their family as well as consider the
community. Others will respond with panic, perhaps even using
violence to obtain vaccines and drugs or try to protect
themselves or their loved ones at the expense of others.
How most of our citizens will respond will depend largely
on what they hear from the President and their elected leaders,
and how they see our Government respond. This means we must be
prepared.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Nunn
Chairman Biden and members of the committee, it is a privilege and
honor for me to come back to the United States Senate where I spent so
much of my life. I thank you for dedicating the first of these hearings
to the threats of bioterrorism and the spread of infectious diseases.
Biological terrorism is one of our greatest national security threats,
and one that cannot be addressed by Department of Defense standard
operating procedures. The specter of a biological weapons attack--and
the parallel peacetime threat of a naturally occurring infectious
disease outbreak--are unique, and they deserve the time and focus you
are devoting to them today.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you may know, this
past June at Andrews Air Force Base, I was a participant in the
exercise Dark Winter--which simulated a biological weapons attack on
the United States. It's a lucky thing for the United States that this
was just a test and not a real emergency. But, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee, our lack of preparation is a real emergency.
During my 24 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I saw
scenarios and satellite photos and Pentagon plans for most any category
of threat you can imagine. But a biological weapons attack on the
United States fits no existing category of security threats.
Psychologist Abraham Maslow once wrote: ``When all you have is a
hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.'' This is not a nail;
it's different from other security threats; and to fight it, we need a
different set of tools than the ones we've been using.
Our exercise involved an intentional release of smallpox. Experts
today believe that a single case of smallpox anywhere in the world
would constitute a global medical emergency. As Members of this
committee know, a wave of smallpox was touched off in Yugoslavia in
1972 by a single infected individual. The epidemic was stopped in its
fourth wave by quarantines, aggressive police and military measures,
and 18 million emergency vaccinations to protect a population of 21
million that was already highly vaccinated.
Mr. Chairman, we have effectively only 12 million doses of vaccine
in America to protect a highly vulnerable population of 275 million
that is essentially not vaccinated. The Yugoslavia crisis mushroomed
from one case; our Dark Winter exercise began with 20 confirmed cases
in Oklahoma City, 30 suspected cases spread out in Oklahoma, Georgia,
and Pennsylvania, and countless more cases of individuals who were
infected but didn't know it. We did not know the time, place or size of
the release, so we had no way of judging the magnitude of the crisis.
All we knew was that we had a big problem and a small range of
responses. One certainty was that it would get worse before it would
get better. Our medical experts told us that we had only two strategies
for effective smallpox containment: (1) isolating those who are sick,
and (2) vaccinating those who have been exposed. Isolation is difficult
when you're not sure who has it; vaccination cannot stop the spread if
you don't have enough of it.
dark winter overview
Dark Winter simulated a series of National Security Council (NSC)
meetings dealing with a terrorist attack involving the covert release
of smallpox in three American cities. The exercise was conducted by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Johns Hopkins
Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, and the ANSER Institute for
Homeland Defense, under the leadership of John Hamre, Tara O'Toole and
Randy Larsen, respectively. Many of the participants in Dark Winter had
served previous Presidents in cabinet or sub-cabinet positions. Most
knew how the NSC worked, and they were all individuals with
considerable expertise and perspective in the security, law enforcement
and health fields.
I will not take the committee's time with a complete replay of the
events, but will share with you the highlights.
In the opening minutes of Dark Winter, we learned from the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that cases of smallpox had just
been diagnosed by the Centers for Disease Control. Given the infectious
nature of the disease, we were facing the start of a smallpox
epidemic--an event with devastating, if not catastrophic, potential.
Like all of you, I received a smallpox vaccination when I was a
child, but I had forgotten the honor of the disease. In the 20th
century, more than 300 million people died from smallpox--more than
those killed in all wars of the century combined. Thanks to a massive
and highly collaborative international campaign, smallpox as a
naturally occurring disease was eradicated. But once eradicated, the
consequences of a smallpox outbreak has become more dangerous with each
passing year as new generations of unvaccinated citizens are born and
the potency of the previous vaccinations diminishes with time.
Unfortunately, we know that smallpox was made into a weapon by the
Soviet Union; we do not know if any other nations or groups have
successfully pursued a similar goal, and this should be a matter of
keen intelligence forces.
Over a 24-hour period at Andrews Air Force Base, our NSC ``war
gamers'' dealt with three weeks of simulated shock, stress and horror.
I was given the role of President of the United States, and Jim Woolsey
was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
We learned that on December 9, 2002, some dozen patients reported
to the Oklahoma City Hospital with a strange illness confirmed quickly
by the CDC to be smallpox. While we only knew about the Oklahoma cases
the first day, we later learned the scope of the initial infections and
the sites of three simultaneous attacks in shopping centers in
Oklahoma, Georgia and Pennsylvania. The initial infection quickly
spread to five states and 3,000 victims although most infected
individuals had not displayed symptoms or gone to the hospital in the
first few days so we did not know who they were or where they were.
We quickly learned that we had only two tools available to deal
with a smallpox attack--vaccination and isolation, and we had only
enough vaccine for one out of every 23 Americans.
I denied the Secretary of Defense's demand that all 2.3 million of
U.S. military personnel be immediately vaccinated wherever they were in
the world. Instead, we administered vaccine to U.S. military, including
the National Guard, and security and medical service personnel who were
on the front lines locally and also those who were in areas of the
world where a smallpox attack was more likely to occur. Our initial
decision was to use our limited vaccine supply to protect health care
workers, local police and fire officials, National Guard on the scene
and local, state and federal officials in the line of fire. We also
devised a strategy to try and put a firewall around the infections that
were being reported, but that strategy was largely ineffective because
of the rapid spread of the disease and our limited supply of vaccine.
So, on the first night of decision-making, we designed a
vaccination strategy, and we ordered accelerated production of new
stock. We asked the Secretary of State to try to find surplus stock
from other countries. I will skip the agonizing details and get to the
conclusions.
On Day Six of the crisis, we had very little vaccine left. We
quickly faced the only alternative--forced isolation with large numbers
of exposed citizens whose locations and identities remained guesswork.
We were down to the really tough questions. Do we force whole
communities and cities to stay in their homes? How? With force? Do we
physically prevent citizens in high-risk areas from fleeing their
communities when they themselves may already be infected? Who provides
food and care for those in forced isolation, particularly when we can
no longer provide vaccine to essential providers?
On Day Twelve, when our war game ended and my brief tenure as
President concluded, we were beginning the next stage of the epidemic--
those who caught smallpox from the original 3,000 people who were
infected in the initial terrorist attack. Our health experts told us
that every two to three weeks the number of cases would increase ten-
fold. To give you a glimpse of how the exercise ended, here are a few
highlights from a simulated CNN broadcast:
On Day Twelve of the worst public health crisis in America's
history, demonstrations for more vaccine in hard-hit
communities disintegrated into riots and looting around the
nation. Interstate commerce has stopped in several regions of
the nation. A suspension of trading on America's stock
exchanges takes effect tomorrow. International commerce with
the U.S. has virtually ceased.
The Centers for Disease Control reports that efforts to stem
the smallpox epidemic have depleted America's inventory of
smallpox vaccine. While the CDC may be out of vaccine, at least
45 Internet websites are offering what they claim are safe,
effective vaccines from previously forgotten stocks. These
claims have not--repeat not--been independently verified, and
authorities urge caution.
At least 25 more states and 10 foreign countries are
reporting smallpox infections. At the United Nations, China has
sponsored a resolution to censure the U.S., blaming America for
reintroducing smallpox to the world. It is demanding that the
U.S. supply the world with vaccine.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I determined from our war game that
public health has become a national security issue, but that we are
unprepared. We were out of vaccine. We were discussing martial law.
Interstate commerce was eroding rapidly. The members of our simulated
NSC, as well as state and local officials, were desperate. We came to
realize too late that our country:
<bullet> Had not produced sufficient vaccine.
<bullet> Had not prepared top officials to cope with this new type of
security crisis.
<bullet> Had not invested adequately in the planning and exercises
absolutely necessary for coordinated response.
<bullet> Had not ensured that the public health infrastructure was
adequate, with built in surge capacity.
<bullet> Had not educated the American people, or developed
strategies to constructively engage the media in educating the
public, about what was happening and what to do.
<bullet> Had not practiced what few plans there were in place.
<bullet> Had not ranked biological terrorism or infectious diseases
as high national priorities.
dilemmas and insights
Most participants in our exercise would have been much more in
their element if we had been dealing with a terrorist bombing. The
effects of a bomb are bounded in time and place. After the explosion,
the nation's leadership knows the geography and the extent of the
damage. You know where to start, and how much it will take to respond
and rebuild. Smallpox, on the other hand, is a silent, ongoing,
invisible attack. It is highly contagious, and spreads in a flash--each
smallpox victim can infect ten to twenty others. It incubates for two
weeks before physically appearing--it comes in waves.
The most insidious effect of a biological weapons attack is that it
can turn Americans against Americans. Once smallpox is released, it is
not the terrorists anymore who are the threat; our neighbors and family
members can become the threat. If they've been exposed, they can kill
you by talking to you. The scene could match the horror of the Biblical
description in Zechariah (8:10): ``Neither was there any peace to him
that went out or came in . . . for I set all men every one against his
neighbour.''
A biological weapons attack cuts across categories and mocks old
strategies. For more than two thousand years the most important rule of
war has been to know your enemy.
In military language, this means that when you face a battlefield
scenario, you draw up an order of battle--you estimate the number of
enemy tanks and planes and troops, their intelligence and logistics
capabilities, and other resources. A biological weapon, however, is an
invisible killer. An attack may go unrecognized for days, only becoming
evident after large numbers of people become sick. In the case of a
contagious disease, our own people would become the enemy's weapons as
they transmit the disease to others, creating ever-widening circles of
exposure.
Even after you know there has been an attack, there still are few
reliable numbers--because you don't know who initially released it, how
much more they have, or where they are. And the usual responses to an
attack are impossible: ``Engage the enemy; open fire; stop their
advance; bring out the wounded.'' You can hardly know who is wounded.
For the participants, this exercise was filled with many such
horrible dilemmas and unpleasant insights.
Number one: We have a fragmented and under-funded public health
system--at the local, state, and federal levels--that does not allow us
to effectively detect and track disease outbreaks in real time.
Two: Lab facilities needed to diagnose the disease are inadequately
supported and laboring with outdated technology.
Three: There is insufficient partnership and communication across
federal agencies and among local, state, and federal governments.
Four: The only way to deal with smallpox is with isolation and
vaccination, but we don't have enough vaccines, and we don't have
enough dedicated facilities, resources, or information for effective
isolation.
Five: A biological weapons attack will be a local event with
national implications, and that guarantees tension between local, state
and national interests. In our exercise, Governor Keating of Oklahoma
asked for vaccine for every one of his citizens--as he had to in the
interests of his state. The President said no, as he had to in the
interests of the nation. Naturally, this demands a high degree of
advanced planning and coordination, because of the diverging interests,
and because key players and partners are answerable to different
leaders.
Six: Most hospitals run at or near full capacity all the time: a
surge in patients from smallpox, combined with the inevitable
infections of hospital personnel, and the flight of some fearful health
care professionals, would create a catastrophic overload.
Seven: There will be a dearth of information on this kind of event.
My staff and cabinet could not tell me ten percent of what I wanted to
know: ``How many cases are there right now? How many more cases can we
expect? Will there be more attacks? When and where did the first
infections take place? Who released it? What's the worst-case scenario?
Is our vaccine supply secure and safe for use? Will other countries
loan us emergency vaccine to keep the disease from spreading all over
the world?
There are many tradeoffs. One of the biggest: We have 12 million
vaccines; that's enough for one out of every 23 Americans. How do we
decide whom to vaccinate?
Do we take power from the Governors and federalize the National
Guard? Do we seize hotels and convert them into hospitals? Do we close
borders and block all travel? What level of force do we use to keep
someone sick with smallpox in isolation? Do we keep people known or
thought to be exposed quarantined in their homes? Do we guarantee 2.3
million doses of vaccine to the military; or do we first cover all
health care providers? Do we take strong measures that protect health,
but could undermine public support or destroy the economy?
Finally: How do you talk to the public in a way that is candid, yet
prevents panic--knowing that panic itself can be a weapon of mass
destruction? My staff had two responses: ``We don't know'' and ``You're
late for your press conference.''
I told people in the exercise: ``I would never go before the press
with this little information,'' and Governor Keating--who knows about
dealing with disaster, said: ``You have no choice.'' And I went, even
though I did not have answers for the public's most urgent questions:
``How do you plan to protect our families?'' ``How rapidly and how far
will it spread?'' And ``Why isn't there enough vaccine?''
Naturally, there are some skeptics anytime you describe a dire
threat to the United States. I want to tell the committee: I am
convinced the threat of a biological weapons attack on the United
States is as urgent as it is real. As Secretary Rumsfeld said in his
confirmation hearings: ``I would rank bioterrorism quite high in terms
of threats . . . It does not take a genius to create agents that are
enormously powerful, and they can be done in mobile facilities, in
small facilities.'' An experiment some years ago showed that a
scientist whose specialty was in another field was able to weaponize
anthrax on his first attempt for less than $250,000.
Hundreds of labs and repositories around the world sell biological
agents for legitimate research--and the same substances used in
legitimate research can be turned into weapons research. In addition,
the massive biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union
remains a threat, at least to the extent that materials and know-how
could flow to hostile forces. At its peak, the program employed 70,000
scientists and technicians and made twenty tons of smallpox. One
Russian official was quoted some years ago in The New Yorker saying:
``There were plenty of opportunities for staff members to walk away
with an ampule.'' There still are.
According to a very prominent press report, former Soviet
biological weapons scientists have been aggressively--and in some eases
successfully--recruited by Iran. And Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, who headed
the United Nations special commission that investigated Iraq's arsenal
after the Gulf War, and who we are lucky to have on the Board of
Directors of NTI, had testified before Congress that in 1991 Iraq had
300 biological bombs.
So the ability of people to acquire or create biological weapons
should be clear beyond any doubt. And no one should doubt how lethal
biological weapons could be. In 1979, a small amount of anthrax escaped
from a Soviet biological weapons lab in Sverdlovsk. Seventy-seven cases
of human anthrax occurred in the city surrounding the lab. Sixty-six
died, and new cases were appearing as late as 47 days after the leak.
All this resulted from only a tiny amount of anthrax being released--on
the order of ounces. It doesn't take much imagination to envision the
catastrophe that would result if someone deliberately released a much
larger quantity.
It is important not to overstate this threat. But it is not an
overstatement to say it is real, it is dangerous, and if it occurred
today, it would catch us unprepared.
Michael Osterholm and John Schwartz, in their book Living Terrors,
told about the experience of one doctor who knew his state was one of
the best-trained areas of the country for a biological weapons attack.
One day he conducted some unscientific research. He discovered that the
total city stockpile for dealing with an anthrax attack would not cover
even 600 patients. He found that a doctor trained in biological weapons
failed to diagnose anthrax when the classic symptoms were described; a
doctor in the radiology department failed to recognize inhalation
anthrax when shown an X-ray; and a voice mail message describing a
bioterrorism concern went unreturned by the state health department for
three days.
next steps
In fairness, we are making progress. The Clinton administration
deserves credit for recognizing that a biological weapons attack is
different from warfare or other terrorist threats and for targeting
funds to address it. That initiative includes strengthening the public
health infrastructure, creating a pharmaceutical stockpile for civilian
use, a contract to develop and produce a new smallpox vaccine, research
to develop new and improved diagnostics, drugs and vaccines, programs
to train first responders (police and fire departments as well as
public health and medical professionals) across the United States, and
investments in new technologies to help detect biological agents.
Under the Bush administration, these efforts are continuing and in
some eases, funding is increasing. It is also heartening that Secretary
Thompson has named a senior advisor on bioterrorism who previously
directed the program on bioterrorism at the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. These are positive steps. Still, we have to do more--
and quickly.
Before detailing the issues that I believe deserve the greatest
attention, we should keep in mind that the results of biological
attacks would vary according to the specific agent used. Technology and
training for early recognition of the type of pathogen are essential.
This exercise gave us valuable lessons about a possible smallpox
attack. The circumstances would be very different in the case of an
anthrax attack, for example. In the event of an attack using anthrax,
vaccination and isolation would be irrelevant, but antibiotics would
need to be administered on the scene immediately.
For the participants, the Dark Winter exercise instilled in all of
us that there is much work to be done:
Number one: Clearly, measures that will deter or prevent
bioterrorism are the most cost effective means to counter threats to
public health and social order. We need to prevent the proliferation of
biological weapons, in part by strengthening intelligence gathering
against such threats, but also by providing peaceful research options
to scientists in the former Soviet Union. Efforts to fight
proliferation require a global approach, including finding a way to
strengthen and enforce the Biological Weapons Convention.
Two: We need to focus more attention, concern and resources on the
specific threat of bioterrorism--understanding that it is different
from other threats we face. Biological weapons must be countered with
new protocols for securing dangerous pathogens, with increased
vigilance and surveillance, as well as with increased supplies of
medicines and vaccines and significantly increased training.
Three: We need to recognize the central role of public health and
medicine in this effort and engage these professionals fully as
partners on the national security team. We must act on the
understanding that public health is an important pillar in our national
security framework. In the event of a biological weapons attack--
millions of lives will depend on how quickly doctors diagnose the
illness, communicate their findings, and bring forth a fast and
effective response at the local and federal level. This means, clearly,
that public health and medical professionals must be part of the
national security team. Planning for an event like this is not the
exclusive purview of the Department of Defense, the National Security
Council, the CIA and the Department of Energy. The Department of Health
and Human Services (CDC, FDA, NIH, etc.) must also be included.
This may seem obvious enough. But several years ago, when
administration officials were meeting to discuss supplemental funding
legislation for defense against biological weapons--the presiding
official from the Office of Management and Budget greeted the officials
from the NSC, and FBI and CIA and DOD, then saw the Assistant Secretary
from Health and Human Services at the table, did a double-take and
said: ``What are you doing here?'' Health officials should not need to
be given directions to the White House Situation Room in an emergency.
Four: We need to identify and put into practice the mechanisms by
which all levels of government will interact and work together. It is
critical that we understand our differing roles, responsibilities,
capabilities, and authorities, and plan on how we will work together
before an act of terrorism occurs.
Five: We need to reexamine and modernize the legal framework for
epidemic control measures and the appropriate balance with civil
liberties--the laws that would apply if we were to find ourselves
managing the crisis that would come with a biological weapons attack.
These laws vary from state to state and many are antiquated. We need to
make sure that they are up-to-date, consistent with our current social
values and priorities, and we need to reacquaint high-level officials
in all areas of response with the specific authorities these laws
provide, and how they can implement them.
Six: There should be a clear plan for providing the news media with
timely and accurate information to help save lives and prevent panic.
Seven: We need to increase the core capacities of our public health
system to detect, track and contain epidemics, by providing resources
for effective surveillance systems, diagnostic laboratory facilities,
and communication links to other elements of the response effort.
Eight: The national pharmaceutical stockpile should be built to
capacity, including extra production capability for drugs and vaccines,
with heightened security at the various dispersal sites. We must not
fall victim to a twin attack that releases a bio-agent and
simultaneously destroys our drugs and vaccines.
Nine: We need to develop plans for a surge of patients in the
nation's hospitals to make the best use of existing resources in the
event of an emergency. This will require careful advance planning,
including how to utilize ancillary facilities such as gymnasiums or
armories, since most hospitals are operating at or near capacity right
now.
Ten: We need to increase funding for biomedical research to develop
new vaccines, new therapeutic drugs, and new rapid diagnostic tests for
bioweapon agents.
Eleven: We need to encourage the scientific community to confront
the sinister potential of modern biological research, and help them
devise systems and practices that ensure the safe, secure storage of,
and access to, dangerous pathogens.
Twelve: Officials at the highest levels of the federal, state, and
local government need to participate in exercises like Dark Winter to
understand the importance of advance preparation. Plans must be
exercised, evaluated, and understood by decision-makers if they are to
prove useful in a time of crisis.
I know how difficult it is to find funding for new initiatives, and
public health is often left behind. We need to think about supporting
public health activities in the same way we think about our national
defense. Congress and the public should understand that expanding
disease surveillance, creating additional lab capacity and enhancing
vaccine production capabilities will benefit the United States not only
in responding to a biological weapons attack, but also by improving our
responses to natural disease outbreaks. We have a chance to defend the
nation against its adversaries and improve the public health system
with the same steps.
the nuclear threat initiative--a new foundation
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, encouraging and helping
our government to deter, prevent, and defend against biological
terrorism is a central part of our mission at the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI)--the organization founded by Ted Turner and guided by
an experienced board that Ted and I co-chair. We are dedicated to
reducing the global threat from biological, nuclear, and chemical
weapons by increasing public awareness, encouraging dialogue,
catalyzing action, and promoting new thinking about these dangers in
this country and abroad.
We fully recognize that only our government can provide the
leadership and resources to achieve our security and health priorities.
But within that context, NTI is:
<bullet> Seeking ways to reduce the threat from biological weapons
and their consequences.
<bullet> Exploring ways to increase education, awareness and
communication among public health experts, medical
professionals, and scientists, as well as among policy makers
and elected officials--to make sure more and more people
understand the nature and scope of the biological weapons
threat.
<bullet> Considering ways to improve infectious disease surveillance
around the globe--including rapid and effective detection,
investigation, and response. This is a fundamental defense
against any infectious disease threat, whether it occurs
naturally or is released deliberately.
<bullet> Stimulating and supporting the scientific community in its
efforts to limit inappropriate access to dangerous pathogens
and to establish standards that will help prevent the
development and spread of biological agents as weapons.
<bullet> And finally, NTI is searching for ways to help our
government and the Russian government to facilitate the
conversion of Russian bioweapons facilities and know-how to
peaceful purposes, to secure biomaterials for legitimate use or
destruction, and to improve security of dangerous pathogens
worldwide.
concluding remarks
Mr. Chairman, enemies don't normally attack us where we are strong;
they target us where we are weak. Enemies of the United States are not
eager to engage us militarily; they saw what happened in Desert Storm.
They will attack us where they believe we are vulnerable. Today, we are
vulnerable to biological terrorism and those who perpetuate such an act
are not likely to be quickly identified or leave a return address. It
is critical that we prepare with all possible speed, because if an
attack occurs, and succeeds, there will be others. Preparing is
deterring.
Our first priority must be prevention. Whether the enemy achieves
its objectives in an attack depends, to a large extent, on how the
American people respond. Panic is as great a danger as disease. Some
will respond like saints--doing whatever they can, exhibiting brave and
selfless patriotism--to meet the needs of family and community. Others
will respond with panic, perhaps even using violence to obtain vaccines
or drugs, or try to protect themselves or their loved ones from
exposure. The distance between these two is broad. How most of our
citizens will respond will depend largely on what they hear from the
President and their elected leaders, and how they see our government
respond. This means we must be prepared.
When America faced possible financial panic in March of 1933,
President Roosevelt did three things immediately upon taking office: he
ordered the banks to close temporarily, he proposed emergency banking
legislation, and he explained his plan to the public in the first of
his regular national radio broadcasts.
If he had not talked reassuringly to the American people, his plan
might not have worked. But if he had talked, and had no plan, his talk
would not have been reassuring. In the event of a biological weapons
attack, no President, no matter how great his natural gifts, will be
able to reassure the public and prevent panic unless we are better
prepared than we are right now.
If we are well prepared--with the ability to detect the disease
quickly, report it swiftly, and implement the appropriate infection
control measures, including the provision of necessary drugs or
vaccines for all those who came in contact with it--then the President
of the United States will address the American people with knowledge,
with courage, and with confidence, and the people will respond in kind.
Whether this or a future President will exert this essential leadership
will depend in large part on how we all address this issue now.
I commend the Committee for tackling such a difficult but important
matter. Our country's protection and safety depend on your leadership.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Woolsey.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, AND PARTNER, SHEA & GARDNER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a three-and-a-
half-page statement with some attachments. If it's all right, I
will just submit it for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection. That will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Woolsey. I will just use it as notes to give a briefer
summary. I will not attempt to duplicate Senator Nunn's
testimony regarding our ``Dark Winter'' exercise. I have three
broad points to make with respect to trying to avoid a disaster
of the sort that we faced in this game.
First, 5 years ago the CIA and the Energy Department via
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory asked me to co-chair a review of
the country's capacity to deal with terrorism using weapons of
mass destruction.
Most of that review is classified, but Joe Nye, my co-
chairman, and I did write an op-ed, which I've attached, in
which we stress that we believe that it is the case that
terrorism using weapons of mass destruction--and we thought at
the time and I think still biological is the most difficult of
these--ought to be the very highest priority in U.S. National
Security Policy.
Biological weapons in terms of number of people killed
could match a nuclear attack. And in terms of simplicity,
unfortunately, it is far simpler to work with biological agents
than even chemicals in many cases, particularly as far as scope
and volume of equipment is concerned.
Often you don't need to smuggle anything. Anthrax grows in
many cow pastures of the world, and much of the equipment that
one would need to weaponize it is transportable. Some of it is
little more complex than that for, say, a microbrewery attached
to a restaurant, which in fact the equipment rather resembles
in some ways.
Happily, there are some very difficult parts of this
process which led Aum Shinrikyo to forsake biological weapons
and move to chemical weapons for their attack in Tokyo. But
there are good reasons to believe that one of the reasons, for
example, Iraq has been able to hide almost all of its
biological weapons, even when UNSCOM was in the country
operating somewhat effectively, was because it was moving both
biological agents and the equipment around, perhaps with the
Special Republican Guard that protects Saddam. This should give
you some idea of the mobility and size of this type of
equipment.
Second, I served on a National Terrorism Commission chaired
by Ambassador Jerry Bremmer that reported to the Congress of
last summer. And we said in that report that although
consequence management is of course vitally important, and
that's much of what we dealt with in ``Dark Winter,''
intelligence really is not only the first line of defense but
the best weapon against many aspects of terrorism. Because the
consequences are so horrible trying to contain them once an
attack has occurred, as we showed in ``Dark Winter,'' is
extraordinarily difficult.
Now, one reason for example is that vaccines and
antibiotics may be made ineffective by genetic modification of
the biological agents. We know that the Russians were involved
in doing this with anthrax. We learned about it in 1997. And
for 4 years we have been asking the Russian Government for
samples of their genetically modified anthrax. So far we have
not received any. This may have spawned some of the work late
in the Clinton administration that has been reported in the
press recently to try to figure out how to deal with a
genetically modified biological agent used in a terrorist
attack.
Back in the cold war, we could keep pretty good track of
some of the major threats to our country, Soviet ICBMs and the
like, submarines, with satellite reconnaissance. That tends not
to be the case with something like biological agents, whether
used by governments or by terrorists or by some combination.
As Senator Nunn pointed out, biological agents lend
themselves to deception. I would say if a terrorist attack
using biological agents against the United States occurred and
it seemed at first as if the Government of Iran or Shiite
groups might be behind it, we should look very closely at Iraq
because it might be a false flag operation.
And conversely, if it seemed initially as if it might have
come from Iraq, we should perhaps look to Iran.
With respect to difficulties and problems with collecting
intelligence, I want to highlight two that we stressed in our
terrorism Commission report last summer.
First of all, the CIA has in effect certain guidelines
issued in late 1995, I hasten to say after I stepped down from
the job in the Agency, in response to a highly publicized case
in Guatemala. Those guidelines make it considerably more
difficult than it needs to be to recruit agents inside
terrorist organizations because rather cumbersome procedures
apply to the recruitment of any spy who may have a violent
background or any history of human rights violations.
Mr. Chairman, these rules may be defensible when one is
recruiting spies inside governments. There are a lot of good
people trapped inside bad governments who have over the years
volunteered to work for the CIA or other parts of Western
intelligence.
But in my judgment and in the unanimous judgment of our
Commission, these rules make absolutely no sense with respect
to terrorist groups, because the only people that are in
terrorist groups are people who want to be terrorists. And that
means they have a background in violence and human rights
violations.
If you make it difficult for a CIA case officer in, say,
Beirut to recruit spies with this sort of background, he'll be
able to do a dandy job of telling you what's going on inside,
for example, the churches and the Chamber of Commerce in
Beirut. But we don't really care what's going on there. He'll
have no idea, however, what's going on inside Hezbollah.
The CIA today says that they have turned down no
recruitments because of these guidelines. But with all due
respect, that's not the problem. The problem, as we were told
on the Commission by a number of current and former
intelligence officers, is the number of approaches that are not
made to recruit people inside terrorist organizations because
of the cumbersome nature of these guidelines.
The Commission also looked at the FBI guidelines for
domestic work. I use the word work because the FBI strictly
speaking does not conduct domestic intelligence operations.
It's not an intelligence agency. It's a law enforcement agency.
It investigates individual crimes.
Here I want to stress that we are dealing with the civil
rights of Americans, and I think we should all agree that
special care is needed in making any changes. But let me state
the following hypothetical.
A conscience-stricken member of a militia group affiliated
with Christian Identity, as these groups call themselves--many
people just call them Identity groups, but they call themselves
Christian Identity--comes to an FBI office somewhere in the
United States. He says that at last night's meeting of the
group they were discussing the importance of preparing for
Armageddon between the Children of Adam, Aryans, in this
group's belief, and the Children of the Devil, everybody else.
One member reportedly stood up and shouted, ``Anthrax for
Armageddon'' and everybody began to take up the same chant. The
conscience-stricken member was worried that some of the group
might act on its enthusiasm.
I believe it would be surprising to most people to realize
that in this hypothetical case the FBI would not be permitted
under current guidelines to open a full investigation or to
apply to a Federal court for warrants to conduct electronic
surveillance or wiretaps, nor would it be permitted to recruit
new informants beyond the conscience-stricken individual. It
could only follow the matter as best it could without using
these tools.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, on this intelligence point, a
particular bete noire of mine, often CIA case officers and FBI
Special Agents who work in the terrorism area in these
litigious times are forced to buy personal liability insurance
for fear of being sued individually for steps taken pursuant to
their authorized duties when combating terrorism.
Under a recent statute, Federal agencies need reimburse
only one half of cost of this insurance. The rest of the
premium is paid by the Special Agents or case officers out of
their pockets.
It would seem the very least we could do is pay the full
cost for premiums of liability insurance that FBI and CIA
employees in the front ranks of the war against terrorism have
to take out in order to have the privilege of protecting us
without risking bankruptcy.
Third and final point, Mr. Chairman, I know this is not a
hearing on ballistic missile defense, about which I testified
before this committee in late July, and I fully agree that this
country's more likely to be subjected to attack using
biological agents via terrorism, state-sponsored or otherwise,
than via ballistic missiles.
But in my view that in no way diminishes the importance of
planning for and deploying ballistic missile defense, including
particularly those that would deal effectively with missiles
carrying biological weapons.
Dr. Richard Garwin, among others, has pointed out that a
missile carrying sub-munition packages filled with biological
agents could defeat defensive missiles that intercept in mid-
course because the sub-munitions could be released early,
immediately after the missile's boost phase and prior to
interception. There would be too many of them to be intercepted
by mid-course defenses. This is one of the reasons I've been
particularly attracted to boost-phase intercept as an approach
toward missile defense since it would intercept attacking
missiles before the deployment of decoys or such sub-munitions.
Of the five states with biological weapons programs, in
addition to Russia and China, that were listed in last
January's National Intelligence Council assessment of the
biological warfare threat, three, North Korea, Libya and Syria,
are susceptible to having any missile launched from their
territory intercepted by sea-based boost-phase intercept.
One, Iraq, would probably be susceptible to such a defense,
although one might need a site in eastern Turkey; and only one,
Iran, would require a substantially innovative approach such as
boost-phase interceptors based in Russia or in space.
I think there are two reasons, Mr. Chairman, why this
threat of ballistic missiles armed with biological weapons
should concern us. One is blackmail. The threat that we would
be deterred or that our potential allies would be deterred from
protecting the Kuwaits and the South Koreas in the future if we
or our allies were vulnerable to attack from a rogue state such
as Iraq or North Korea with ballistic missiles carrying
biological weapons.
The second is a risk that, as he lost in a crisis and faced
removal from office or worse, a rogue state's leader might opt
for a Gotterdammerung rather than graceful degradation. We know
from Russian memoirs that this was the mind-set of both Fidel
Castro and Che Guevara in 1962 when they urged Mikoyan to
demand a nuclear attack on the United States at the height of
the Cuban Missile Crisis.
And we know from many accounts of the incredibly
destructive orders that Hitler gave, that happily were not
carried out, in May of 1945.
We know of accounts of drug use by national leaders such as
Mao and Hitler, of reliance on soothsayers such as by Saddam
today, and on astrology by the former Chief of the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces.
These types of accounts are simply too numerous through
history for us to be confident that as the number of countries
with ballistic missiles and biological weapons continues to
grow, we will always be blessed with rational and reasonable
adversaries.
We should not have been forced to decide in 1940 between
having effective local police and having a navy. England should
not have been forced to decide in 1587 between protecting
itself against civil insurrection and an Armada from Spain. And
we should not be forced, today, to choose between defending
against terrorists and against ballistic missiles. Both types
of defenses in my view are badly needed. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woolsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. R. James Woolsey
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is an honor to be here
today to testify before you on the important subject of biological
weapons and terrorism.
I will not duplicate Senator Nunn's testimony regarding Dark
Winter, wherein I served as President Nunn's Director of Central
Intelligence. Let me address just three additional points about the
threat of biological weapons.
i. livermore study
Five years ago the CIA and DOE, via Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, asked me to co-chair a review of U.S. preparations to deal
with terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. My co-chairman was
Joseph Nye, the Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, who had served
as the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council when I was DCI in
1993-95. Our report was classified, but we published an op-ed
(attached) that reflected the main points of our review. We put
terrorism using weapons of mass destruction as the highest priority in
U.S. national security policy.
Generally we determined in the Livermore study that the biological
weapons threat was the most serious because destructiveness, at least
in terms of people killed, could match that of nuclear weapons but the
technological and industrial challenges to a terrorist were
considerably less daunting. Happily, there are some real difficulties
in some parts of the weaponization process for biological agents, but
compared to fissionable material many biological agents are far more
readily available--anthrax, e.g., grows in many cow pastures in the
world. Further, the equipment for much of the process of producing
biological weapons is transportable, as are the biological agents
themselves, and indeed the equipment is little more complex than that
for a microbrewery, which it rather resembles. There is good reason to
believe, for example, that one of the reasons Iraq was able to hide
almost all of its biological weapons work from UNSCOM was that it was
moving equipment and biological agents around, quite possibly under the
control of the Special Republican Guard that protects Saddam.
ii. national commission on terrorism
Second, I served on the National Commission on Terrorism (Chaired
by Amb. L. Paul Bremmer) that reported to the Congress last summer.
Although consequence management is a terribly important part of the
national response to terrorism, as we pointed out in that report good
intelligence is not only the first line of defense against terrorism,
but the best weapon against it--because it is the best way to prevent a
terrorist act from occurring. I have attached six pages from our report
that make several points I believe relevant to your deliberations
today.
There are serious flaws, we found, in both the CIA guidelines for
penetrating terrotist groups abroad and in the FBI's guidelines for
dealing with terrorist groups in this country.
CIA 1995 Guidelines
As far as the CIA is concerned, new guidelines issued in late 1995
in response to a highly publicized case in Guatemala make it
considerably more difficult than it needs to be to recruit agents
inside terrorist organizations because special cumbersome procedures
apply to the recruitment of any spy who may have a violent background
or any history of human rights violations.
Mr. Chairman, these rules may be defensible when one is recruiting
spies inside governments--there are a lot of good people trapped inside
bad governments who volunteer to work for the CIA. But they make
absolutely no sense at all with respect to terrorist groups. The only
people in terrorist groups are people who want to be terrorists--hence
they will virtually all have a history of violence and human rights
violations. If you make it difficult for a CIA case officer in, say,
Beirut, to recruit spies with this sort of background, he will be able
to do a dandy job of telling you what's going on inside, e.g., the
churches and the Chamber of Commerce there, as if we cared, but he will
have no idea what Hezbollah is planning.
The CIA today says that they have turned down no recruitment
because of these guidelines, but with all due respect that is not the
problem. The problem, as we heard from a number of current and former
case officers who communicated with the Commission, is the number of
approaches that are not made to potentially useful agents inside
terrorist organizations because of these guidelines. Our Commission
recommended unanimously that these guidelines ``no longer apply to
recruiting terrorist informants.''
FBI Guidelines
The FBI guidelines, our Commission found, are lengthy, complex, and
difficult for FBI Agents in the field to understand (they were also
difficult for Commission members to understand). They too have been
heavily influenced by past controversies, such as some of the
lamentable excesses of the COINTELPRO program of many years ago. Here
we are dealing with the civil rights of Americans and I think we would
all agree that special care is needed. Still, take the following
hypothetical case:
A conscience-stricken member of a militia group affiliated
with Christian Identity (as they call themselves) comes to an
FBI office somewhere in the U.S. He says that at last night's
meeting of the group they were discussing the importance of
preparing for Armageddon between the Children of Adam (Aryans,
in the group's belief) and the Children of the Devil (everyone
else). One member reportedly stood up and shouted ``Anthrax for
Armageddon,'' at which point all began the same chant. The
conscience-stricken member was worried that some of the group
might act on its enthusiasm.
It would be surprising to many, I believe, to realize that in this
hypothetical case the FBI would not be permitted, under current
guidelines, to open a full investigation and apply to a federal court
for warrants to conduct electronic surveillance or wiretaps. Nor would
it be permitted to recruit new informants beyond the conscience-
stricken individual. It could only follow the matter as best it could
without using these tools.
Full Cost of Liability Insurance
One further small but illustrative point about the way we conduct
the war against terrorism: FBI Special Agents and CIA Case Officers in
the field are, in these litigious times, often forced to buy personal
liability insurance for fear of being sued individually for steps taken
pursuant to their authorized duties when they are combating terrorism.
Under a recent statute federal agencies need reimburse only one-half of
the cost of this insurance. The rest of the premium is paid by the
Special Agents and Case Officers out of their pockets. It would seem
that the very least we could do is pay the full cost of the premiums
for the liability insurance that FBI and CIA employees in the front
ranks of the war against terrorism have to take out in order, without
risking bankruptcy, to have the privilege of protecting us.
priorities
Mr. Chairman, I know that this is not a hearing on ballistic
missile defense, about which I testified before this Committee in late
July. But just a word about priorities, if I might. I fully agree that
we are more likely to be subjected, in this country, to an attack using
biological agents via terrorists--state sponsored or otherwise--than by
ballistic missile. But in my view that in no way diminishes the
importance of planning for and deploying ballistic missile defenses,
including particularly those that would deal effectively with missiles
carrying biological weapons.
Dr. Richard Garwin, among others, has pointed out that a missile
carrying sub-munition packages filled with biological agents could
defeat defensive missiles that intercept in midcourse because these
sub-munitions could be released early, immediately after the missile's
boost phase, and prior to interception. There would be too many of them
for the mid-course defensive system to deal with. This is one of the
reasons I have been particularly attracted to the boost-phase intercept
approach toward missile defense, since it would intercept attacking
missiles before the deployment of decoys or such sub-munitions. Of the
five states with biological weapons programs (in addition to Russia and
China) listed in the National Intelligence Council's assessment in
January of this year, ``The Biological Warfare Threat,'' three (North
Korea, Libya, and Syria) are susceptible to having any missile launched
from their territory intercepted by sea-based boost-phase intercept.
One (Iraq) could be susceptible to such a defense if the intercepting
missile were fast enough, although augmentation from a land-based site
in Eastern Turkey might be necessary. Only one (Iran) would require a
substantially innovative approach, such as boost-phase interceptors
based in Russia, or in space, to defend against attacks from its
territory.
I think there are two reasons, Mr. Chairman, why this threat of
ballistic missiles armed with biological weapons should concern us.
One is blackmail--the threat that we would be deterred, or
potential allies would be, from protecting the Kuwaits and South Koreas
in the future if we or our allies were vulnerable to attack from a
rogue state such as Iraq or North Korea with ballistic missiles
carrying biological weapons.
The second is the risk that, as he lost in a crisis and faced
removal from office or worse, a rogue state's leader might opt for
Gotterdammerung rather than graceful degradation. We know from Russian
memoirs that this was the mind-set of both Fidel Castro and Che Guevera
in 1962, when they urged Mikoyan to demand a nuclear attack on the U.S.
at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and from many accounts of
the incredibly destructive orders that Hitler gave in May 1945. And the
accounts of drug use (Mao and Hitler), of reliance on soothsayers
(Saddam) and astrology (former Chief of the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces) are simply too numerous throughout history for us to be
confident that--as the numbers of countries with ballistic missiles and
biological weapons continues to grow--we will always be blessed with
rational and reasonable adversaries.
We should not have been forced to decide, in 1940, between having
effective local police and having a Navy; England should not have been
forced to decide, in 1587, between protecting itself against civil
insurrection and an Armada from Spain. And we should not be forced,
today, to choose between defending against terrorists and against
ballistic missiles. Both types of defenses, in my view, are needed
badly.
______
[From the Los Angeles Times]
perspective on terrorism
Defend Against the Shadow Enemy
(By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and R. James Woolsey)
The destruction of the federal building in Oklahoma City and the
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York shocked Americans. But
those tragedies would have been far worse if nuclear, biological or
chemical materials had been involved. After co-chairing a year-long
study for the government, we believe it is increasingly likely they
will be.
For 40 years Americans lived under the fear of Soviet nuclear
attack. The end of the cold war reduced the prospect of a nuclear
holocaust, but ironically, prospects of a nuclear explosion inside the
United States probably have increased. And it is not just the nuclear
threat. Terrorists worldwide have better access to anthrax or sarin
than to nuclear materials. So far, we have been lucky. But we should
not wait for another Pearl Harbor to awaken us to the fact that there
is no greater threat to our security than terrorism involving weapons
of mass destruction.
Skeptics may call us alarmists. Nuclear technology has been around
for 50 years and chemical and biological agents for nearly a century,
yet terrorists have rarely turned to them.